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1. Introduction 
Argentina is a federal country where sub-national governments account for a relatively large fraction 
of government revenues and expenditures. Considering only those revenues defined and collected 
under full sub-national autonomy,1 in 2009 the 24 Argentine provinces and the about 2200 
municipalities collected about 6.4% of GDP or one fifth of the revenues and spent about one half of 
the expenditures of the Consolidated Government.2 It follows that there is a vertical imbalance that is 
higher for provinces than for local governments and tends to be higher for small and poorer 
provinces. This gap is filled by an automatic revenue sharing system of federal taxes that, in turn, 
most provinces share with their own local governments, and by discretionary transfers.3 
Argentina’s federalism has been criticized for the existence of soft-budget constrains combined 
with periodic bail outs from the federal government to the provinces,4 and the lack of transparent 
criteria for the secondary distribution of federal taxes among provinces.5 Moreover, institutional 
pitfalls led Argentina’s federalism into two extremes: too much rigidity or too loose framework, 
given the lack of incentives of the political actors to strike cooperative agreements and the inability 
of the federal government to make credible commitments. As a consequence, sub-national 
governments focused on continuous bids for additional resources instead of focusing on developing 
managerial efforts or improving their own-source revenues.6 
Many studies have shown that the vertical imbalance of Argentine provinces is associated with 
higher per capita expenditures and a weaker fiscal performance.7 Only a few studies tried to estimate 
the impact of high vertical imbalances on own-revenue efforts.8 Moreover, the incentives of local 
                                               
1 Sub-national governments obtain revenues from different sources. In many cases they face constrains to define the tax 
rate or the tax base which distorts the incentives and the citizens’ perceptions about them. Therefore it is better to count 
as own-source revenues only those with substantial autonomy from the upper levels of government. See Ambrosiano 
and Bordignon (2006). Joumard and Kongsrud (2003), Blöchliger and King (2006) and Blöchliger and Rabesona (2009) 
show that in many OECD countries there is an important difference between revenues with substantial sub-national 
autonomy and the figures obtained from the OECD or GFS databases. 
2 See Artana (2007) for an explanation of the problems of using GFS data for Argentina. Provinces accounted for about 
two thirds of the sub-national revenues (with autonomy) and for about 80% of the sub-national expenses.  
3Local governments also receive a fraction of their province own-source tax revenues. See López Murphy and 
Moskovits (1998) and Sanguinetti et al (2001) for an analysis of the provincial revenue sharing schemes.   
4 See for example FIEL (1993, 2003), Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2009), Weingast (2006), Nicolini et al (2002), 
Ahmad and Brosio (2008). 
5 See for example, FIEL (1993) and Tommasi (2002). 
6 See for example Saiegh and Tommasi (1999) and Tommasi (2002). 
7 See for example FIEL (1993) or Jones et al (1997). 
8 For example Jones et al (1999) found some evidence that provinces improved their collection of own-source revenues 
during the 1990’s when they realized that the federal government had a tighter budget constraint imposed by the 
Currency Board. Baldrich (2010) estimated a two-period panel (1998 and 2002) with data of 22 Argentine provinces. 
His dependent variable are provincial own-source revenues (in absolute values and per capita terms) and his explanatory 
3 
politicians to deliver better public services and sound fiscal policies may be undermined not only by 
the size of the vertical imbalance but also by its composition (i.e. unlike automatic transfers, 
discretionary transfers provide the federal government with an instrument to influence sub-national 
decisions). And the composition of sub-national revenues matters too. Property taxes and user fees 
are more visible than other sources of local financing, such as the turnover sales tax.  
During the last decade important changes took place. First, the country suffered a large economic 
crisis and an important rebound with six consecutive years of high growth (from 2003 to 2008), a 
novelty in a country with volatile growth.  
Revenues became more centralized as a consequence of changes in the tax mix that favored the 
federal government,9 and every year since 2003 the Federal Executive was able to pass a budget with 
an underestimation of revenues. With the use of emergency powers that were delegated by Congress 
to the Executive in 2002 (and renewed every year until 2010) the president was able to allocate the 
excess revenues at will. Therefore, discretionary transfers, that were 0.5% of GDP at the end of the 
1990’s increased to an average of 1.7% of GDP in more recent years. 
 There were also important changes in the revenues collected directly by the provinces. Resource-
rich provinces enjoyed a windfall on the royalties they collect from domestic producers. In spite of 
government controls on the domestic price of petroleum and natural gas, royalties doubled in a 
decade (from 0.3% in 1997-99 to 0.6% of GDP in 2007-09). 
Most provinces changed their own-source tax mix, reducing the taxation on property and 
increasing the revenues obtained from a turnover sales tax (even increasing tax rates in spite of the 
extra revenues that a booming economy produced). This may be a consequence of the difficulties to 
maintain the tax base of the real estate tax in real terms because of money illusion, or simply because 
they have other less-visible opportunities.  
Tax revenues of the General Government are high in Argentina, not only compared with the 
average Latin-American country but also compared with its potential tax base.10 However, most 
revenues are collected by the federal government creating a high vertical imbalance that may 
                                                                                                                                                        
variables are the ratio of Central Government transfers to Own-source Revenue, the GINI coefficient, the provincial 
GDP as a proxy of the provincial tax base and the size of each province (measured by their population). He found that 
own-source revenues increase when provinces have: a) a better distribution of income, b) a bigger GDP, c) more 
population, d) less dependence from Central Government grants. 
9 During the 2001-2002 macroeconomic crisis a tax on financial transactions and export taxes were reintroduced. Taxes 
on exports were not shared with the provinces until 2008 when a minor fraction of the collection from export of 
soybeans was distributed among the provinces. The federal government also receives a larger fraction of tax on financial 
transactions than from other taxes (about 70% compared to about 50%).   
10 See Artana and Templado (2010). 
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discourage revenue effort at the sub-national level and increases the odds of federal bailouts.11 
Mobilizing sub-national revenues would allow maintaining the same overall revenue effort but at the 
same time it would improve the provinces’ incentives to deliver better services and reduce the odds 
of future bail outs. Therefore, reforms should focus more on efficiency and income distribution rather 
than on raising more revenues.  
This paper is organized as follows.12 In Section 2 we show the recent evolution of government 
revenues in Argentina and the vertical imbalance. Then we analyze from an economic perspective the 
most important taxes collected by the three levels of government. In section 3 we look at the 
determinants of sub-national revenues and explore the impact of the 2001-2002 crisis and of higher 
federal transfers on the size and composition of the provincial own-source revenues. We found that 
automatic transfers improve the collections of the cascade sales tax and the property tax by enlarging 
the disposable income of the private and public sector of the provinces favored by the regional 
redistribution of income, but discretionary transfers have a different impact: they reduce own-source 
revenue effort and encourage more public investment. This is consistent with the permanent income 
hypothesis and also with the attempt to protect the governor if the Federal government decides to cut 
the money transferred to the province.13 Finally, in Section 4 we analyze different options to improve 
sub-national revenue mobilization in Argentina and we make some proposals to improve it with a 
special focus on alternatives to improve on the cascade provincial sales tax.   
2. Argentina’s tax system and its recent evolution 
Table 1 shows the evolution of revenues and expenditures of the General Government, broken down 
by levels of government as estimated by the Ministry of Economy.14 The data shows the large 
increase in the state participation in the economy (about 12% of GDP in the last decade) and some 
decentralization of expenses from the federal government to subnational governments: for example 
the share of the Federal government in total primary outlays declined from 56% in 2000 to 51% in 
                                               
11 See Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1996). 
12 An earlier version of this paper includes an analysis of the political economy game and the efficacy of local tax 
administration agencies. See Artana et al (2012).  
13 From a political point of view, capital outlays are easier to reduce than current expenditures. It is also easier to raise 
own-source revenues rather than cutting the public sector wage bill if discretional federal transfers are reduced. 
14 Data for local governments is available until 2006. We projected the figures for 2009 assuming a similar growth rate 
of that observed between 2006 and 2009 for a provincial variable that tracks better what happened at the local level. For 
example: i) we use the evolution of the collection of the provincial tax on vehicles to estimate municipal own-source 
taxes because it accounts for the largest share of what is included as local government taxes; ii) non-tax revenues and 
figurative contributions were assumed to follow the same path than provincial transfers to local governments; iii) 
expenses were projected using the evolution of the similar expense at the provincial level (e.g. salaries were projected 
with the same growth rate observed in the provincial wage bill).  
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2009, that of the provinces increased from 36% to 39% and that of local governments increased from 
9% to 10%. 15 
According to the Argentine Constitution, the federal government establishes and receives the 
revenues from taxes on trade (both on imports and on exports); the provinces collect direct taxes 
while indirect taxes are shared between both levels of government. However, the provinces may 
delegate the collection of direct taxes to the federal government, as has been the norm for many 
decades, and share the proceeds from direct and indirect taxes through a revenue sharing agreement. 
Each province is responsible for ensuring adequate revenue sources to its municipalities.  
In practice, the federal government collects a large share of total taxes and then transfers a 
fraction of this collection to provinces that, in turn, transfer money to their local governments. In any 
case, in 2009, provinces and municipalities had own-sources of revenues for about 6.5% of GDP, out 
of total revenues of about 37.6% of GDP (see Table 2).16  
As in most countries, tax revenues are the bulk of government revenues. During the 1990’s tax 
revenues averaged about 22% of GDP. In 2009 they were 50% higher. Most of this change was 
obtained at the federal level by a combination of new taxes and increases in the effective tax rates. 
Provinces increased their collections of a turnover tax, but only to offset declining revenues from 
property taxes (Table 3).17  
 
  
                                               
15 Official figures of revenues and expenditures have some shortcomings: a) some expenditures are not included. One 
notorious example is the provincial pension systems. Provinces include in current transfers the amount of money 
transferred to their pension systems to pay for their deficits, but do not show on a regular basis the total amounts spent in 
pensions and administrative expenses. Therefore, both revenues and expenditures are underestimated by an amount 
equal to the employer’s and employees’ contributions to the provincial pension systems. For 2009 these were 1.80% of 
GDP. Therefore, total provincial revenues were 13.32%of GDP instead of the 11.52% of GDP reported in Table 1 and 
total expenditures were 15.93% of GDP instead of 14.13% of GDP (the deficit of 0.3% of GDP is included in current 
transfers). Note that for the Federal public system there is not such a problem because all expenses are shown in the line 
of Social Security; b) Provincial and municipal taxes include the automatic transfers that the provinces and local 
government receive out of the revenue-sharing systems. For the purpose of our study it is necessary to show them 
separate of own-source taxes. This correction is done in Table 2 for the provinces; c) Own-source municipal taxes are 
included in non-tax revenues because they are named “user fees”. 
16 Data on the composition of government revenues is not totally consistent with the data of Table 1, although the 
sources of information are different agencies of MECON. 
17 We show averages of three years to reduce the impact of one-off events. During 1997, 1998, 2007 and 2008 the 
economy was growing, while in 1999 and 2009 there was a recession. 
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Table 1 : Argentina: General Government  ( % of GDP )
CURRENT REVENUES 15.25% 7.64% 2.43% 25.33% 15.04% 8.51% 2.42% 25.97%
Tax Revenues 13.64% 6.79% 1.19% 21.62% 12.94% 7.46% 1.07% 21.48%
Non Tax Revenues 1.57% 0.85% 1.25% 3.66% 2.10% 1.05% 1.34% 4.49%
Public Companies' Operating Surplus 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 12.83% 8.54% 2.37% 23.74% 15.38% 10.00% 2.47% 27.84%
Consumption 3.33% 7.18% 2.27% 12.77% 3.25% 7.84% 2.33% 13.42%
Interest Payments 1.23% 0.20% 0.01% 1.44% 3.40% 0.66% 0.04% 4.10%
Social Security 5.99% 0.00% 0.00% 5.99% 6.16% 0.00% 0.00% 6.16%
Current Transfers 2.04% 1.17% 0.09% 3.30% 2.42% 1.49% 0.10% 4.02%
Other 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14%
Public Utilities' Operating Deficit 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
CAPITAL REVENUES 1.24% 0.25% 0.04% 1.53% 0.16% 0.19% 0.03% 0.38%
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 1.19% 1.60% 0.46% 3.26% 0.31% 1.25% 0.32% 1.88%
TOTAL REVENUES 16.49% 7.89% 2.48% 26.85% 15.21% 8.70% 2.44% 26.35%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 14.03% 10.15% 2.83% 27.00% 15.69% 11.25% 2.79% 29.72%
Figurative Contributions 0.00% 1.74% 0.22% 1.96% 0.04% 1.70% 0.28% 2.02%
Figurative Expenditure 1.74% 0.22% 0.00% 1.96% 1.70% 0.32% 0.00% 2.02%
GLOBAL RESULT 0.73% -0.74% -0.13% -0.15% -2.14% -1.17% -0.07% -3.37%
PRIMARY RESULT 1.96% -0.54% -0.12% 1.30% 1.27% -0.51% -0.04% 0.72%
CURRENT REVENUES 18.03% 9.23% 2.23% 29.49% 23.52% 11.35% 2.68% 37.55%
Tax Revenues 16.48% 8.07% 1.13% 25.68% 13.58% 10.08% 1.50% 25.16%
Non Tax Revenues 1.55% 1.16% 1.10% 3.81% 9.94% 1.27% 1.18% 12.39%
Public Companies' Operating Surplus 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 12.30% 8.73% 2.11% 23.13% 20.40% 11.78% 2.77% 34.95%
Consumption 2.99% 6.64% 1.94% 11.57% 4.19% 9.69% 2.57% 16.45%
Interest Payments 1.29% 0.37% 0.01% 1.67% 2.44% 0.30% 0.01% 2.75%
Social Security 4.80% 0.00% 0.00% 4.80% 7.48% 0.00% 0.00% 7.48%
Current Transfers 3.18% 1.72% 0.15% 5.05% 5.84% 1.79% 0.19% 7.82%
Other 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.26%
Public Utilities' Operating Deficit 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19%
CAPITAL REVENUES 0.05% 0.22% 0.01% 0.28% 0.13% 0.17% 0.10% 0.40%
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 0.93% 1.80% 0.33% 3.05% 2.39% 2.35% 0.69% 5.43%
TOTAL REVENUES 18.08% 9.45% 2.24% 29.77% 23.65% 11.52% 2.78% 37.95%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 13.22% 10.53% 2.44% 26.19% 22.79% 14.13% 3.46% 40.38%
Figurative Contributions 0.05% 2.30% 0.24% 2.58% 0.02% 2.13% 0.51% 2.66%
Figurative Expenditure 2.30% 0.28% 0.00% 2.58% 2.13% 0.53% 0.00% 2.66%
GLOBAL RESULT 2.60% 0.94% 0.04% 3.58% -1.25% -1.02% -0.17% -2.43%
PRIMARY RESULT 3.89% 1.31% 0.05% 5.25% 1.19% -0.72% -0.15% 0.32%
Source: Based on MECON Investment and Saving Account of the General Government and Own Estimates for Local Governments and GDP for 2009.
Notes: 1/ Figurative expenditures are transfers from one level of government to finance expenses of another level. They are registered as figurative 
contributions in the recipient government. 
1993 2000
National 
Public 
Sector
Provinces 
and Buenos 
Aires City
Local 
Governments
TOTAL National 
Public Sector
Provinces 
and Buenos 
Aires City
Local 
Governments
TOTAL
TOTAL
2004 2009
National 
Public 
Sector
Provinces 
and Buenos 
Aires City
Local 
Governments
TOTAL National 
Public Sector
Provinces 
and Buenos 
Aires City
Local 
Governments
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1993 2000 2004 2009 3/
Variation 
1993-2009
Contribution 
to the total 
variation 1993-
2009
Taxes on Income, Profits, & Capital Gains 2.03% 3.98% 5.26% 5.24% 3.21% 27%
Taxes on Property 1.41% 1.62% 1.46% 1.36% -0.05% 0%
Taxes on Goods and Services 1/ 10.77% 11.16% 13.01% 15.27% 4.50% 37%
Taxes on International Trade 1.07% 0.73% 3.05% 3.68% 2.62% 22%
    of which import duties 1.03% 0.70% 0.73% 0.71% -0.32% -3%
   of which taxes on exports 0.01% 0.01% 2.29% 2.95% 2.94% 24%
Other Taxes 0.78% 0.59% 0.54% 0.48% -0.30% -2%
Total Taxes 16.05% 18.08% 23.32% 26.03% 9.98% 83%
Social Contributions to Public System 5.58% 3.40% 3.04% 7.11% 1.54% 13%
Social Contributions to Private pension funds 0.00% 1.48% 0.93% 0.00% 0.00% 0%
Total Taxes and Social Contributions 21.63% 22.97% 27.29% 33.14% 11.51% 96%
Other Revenues  2/ 3.92% 4.63% 4.26% 4.45% 0.53% 4%
Total  Government Revenues 25.55% 27.59% 31.54% 37.59% 12.05% 100%
Federal Government 70% 64% 71% 75% 10.40% 86%
Provinces 15% 14% 13% 13% 1.11% 9%
Municipalities 5% 5% 4% 4% 0.09% 1%
Private Pension Funds 0% 5% 3% 0% 0.00% 0%
Other agencies 10% 12% 10% 8% 0.44% 4%
Notes: 1/ Revenues net of tax reimburses to exporters. Includes VAT, Excises,  100% of tax on financial transactions and provincial turnover tax
2/ Includes Grants and municipal revenues.
3/ 2009 Nominal GDP estimated by FIEL
Source: Authors ' ca l cul ations  based on DNIAF-MECON and FIEL.
Collected by: 
Table 2: Argentina. General Government Revenues (% of GDP)
 
Average 
1997-99
Average 
2007-09
Federal 17.10% 26.38%
VAT 6.66% 7.56%
Excises 2.03% 1.66%
Personal assets 0.21% 0.33%
Income tax 3.22% 5.30%
Social Security 3.67% 5.53%
Export taxes 0.01% 2.97%
Taxes on imports 0.90% 0.81%
Financial Transactions 0.00% 1.87%
Other 0.40% 0.33%
Provinces 3.87% 4.48%
Turnover sales 2.18% 3.24%
Real State 0.63% 0.38%
Automobiles 0.31% 0.26%
Other 0.75% 0.60%
Other Provincial Revenues
Shared Federal Taxes 5.73% 6.79%
Federal transfers 0.50% 1.69%
Other Provincial Own Source Revenues 0.74% 1.03%
Royalties 0.29% 0.59%
Memo items
Provinces Total Revenues 10.84% 13.99%
Provincial Expenditures 11.91% 14.92%
Provinces Deficit 1.07% 0.93%
Source: Author's calculations based on MECON
Table 3: Federal and Provincial Taxes (% of GDP)
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Revenue collections became more centralized, with the federal government increasing its share 
from 69-70% in 1993 or 2000 to 75% in 2009.18 Provinces reduced their deficits but did not 
eliminate them in spite of the expansion of the economy. The average deficit that was 9% of 
expenditures at the end of the 1990’s was cut to 6% in 2007-2009, but naturally some provinces had 
a deficit higher than the average, notably the emblematic province of Buenos Aires with a deficit that 
averaged 10% of its expenditures during 2007-2009. 
The vertical imbalances increased modestly, but with important differences across provinces. For 
example, some oil-producing provinces that collect royalties reduced the vertical imbalance given the 
increase in the domestic prices of crude oil and natural gas at the producer level, while the five 
advanced provinces increased (modestly) their dependence from federal transfers. 
The composition of provincial taxes changed with an important increase of the collections from 
the turnover sales tax and a reduction of taxes on property.19 Although the tax bases are not the same, 
it is interesting to note that the collection of the provincial turnover tax as a share of the collection of 
the federal VAT increased from 33% in 1997/99 to 43% in 2007-09 at the same time that the 
provincial collection of taxes on property (real estate plus automobiles) was reduced from 307% as a 
share of the collection of the federal tax on personal assets in 1997/99 to 114% in 2007/09. This 
suggests that the change in the composition of provincial own-source taxes was a political decision 
rather than a consequence of alterations in the tax bases.   
Provinces received more automatic transfers from the federal government through the different 
tax sharing agreements, but discretionary transfers multiplied by three (measured as % of GDP). 
Provinces have no important restrictions to spend the revenues obtained from tax sharing,20 although 
there are some restrictions on the money received through discretionary transfers.  
Unfortunately data for local governments is not updated.21 The last available year with a 
complete data set is 2000 and only a few municipalities provide updated information in their web 
                                               
18 Mandatory contributions to private pension funds were added to allow for a consistent comparison. Most workers 
opted to make contribution to private pension funds from mid 1994 to the end of 2008 when the government decided to 
nationalize them and forced all workers to contribute to the public pay-as-you-go system. 
19 A few small provinces transferred in the early 1990s the collection of taxes on real estate and automobiles to their 
municipalities.  
20One exemption is the transfers for education and health that accompanied the second stage of decentralization of these 
services that took place in the early 1990’s. However, as their value was fixed in nominal terms it has eroded 
substantially in real terms. 
21 Data for the municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires (see Table below) show that between 1997 and 2007 the 
collections of the provincial property tax increased 83% compared to a 71% increase for the property tax collected by 
local governments. In the same period, collections of the cascade sales tax soared at the provincial level and also at the 
municipal level (although not all municipalities use sales as the tax base of their taxes on business). 
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pages. Sanguinetti et al (2001) showed that there is an important diversity among the 23 provinces22 
in the share of local governments in the consolidated sub-national expenditures (from 8% to 32%). 
Their econometric analysis focused on the determinants of the large variation in per capita municipal 
expenditures. The main results were: a) higher transfers per capita lead to higher expenditures per 
capita (similarly to what was found in studies about the Argentine provinces), b) political variables 
had an impact (more decentralization of the local power reduces per capita expenditures), and c) the 
size of the local government, the economic activity or poverty had no impact on expenditures per 
capita. The authors did not explore the impact on own-source revenues. 
The changes in federal and provincial revenues took place in a changing environment. The 
implosion of economic activity that followed after the default of the federal public debt, the large 
depreciation of the peso and the financial crisis of 2001-2002 encouraged the government to adopt 
emergency measures that increased centralization.23 Centralization may have afforded an “insecure” 
political regime with leverage over sub-national governments.24 Large exogenous shocks may change 
the relative bargaining power of the different levels of government and may change tax policies.25 
The 2001-2002 Argentine crisis is an example. It created a political vacuum that the 2003 
presidential election could not fill immediately given that the elected president obtained only 22% of 
the votes. The economic recovery, the possibility to adopt emergency measures without Congress 
approval and the use of discretionary transfers allowed the government to gain political muscle later. 
The 2001-2002 macroeconomic crisis also brought to an end several fiscal agreements that had 
been signed between the federal government and the provinces. In particular, provinces regained 
freedom to set the tax rates and tax bases of the turnover sales tax and abandoned the path of gradual 
                                                                                                                                                        
In Arg$ million 1997 2007 % change
Total Tax Revenues 4.510.174 13.029.150 189%
Cascade Sales Tax 2.113.650 8.506.267 302%
Property tax 667.295 1.224.293 83%
Automobiles 484.631 804.095 66%
Other 1.244.598 2.494.495 100%
Total Tax Revenues 1.744.141 3.716.093 113%
Cascade Sales Tax 323.770 1.007.760 211%
Property tax 878.815 1.504.162 71%
Other 541.556 1.204.171 122%
Municipalities of the Prov of Buenos Aires Own-Source Tax revenues
Province of Buenos Aires Own-source tax revenues
 
 
22 The City of Buenos Aires has no local governments. 
23 Oates (1978) provided some evidence that in deep crises there is a tendency to centralize government responsibilities. 
24 Weingast (2006).  
25Ambrosiano and Bordignon (2006).  
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reduction of tax rates on primary production and manufacturing that had been agreed in the early 
1990’s to reduce the cascade effect.26  
 
2.a. Taxes collected by the federal government 
 
The federal government is de facto responsible for collecting most taxes in Argentina. The 
taxation on consumption includes: a) a VAT of the consumption type at a general rate of 21% 
although some utilities are taxed at a higher rate of 27% for their sales to firms to piggy back on their 
collection effort, and some foods are taxed at 10.5%. Financial services are exempt as is customary in 
most countries; and b) special excises on the consumption of fuels, tobacco and beverages, most of 
them ad-valorem. The taxation of income flows and assets includes: a) a personal income tax on 
labor and capital income at a progressive rate (the top marginal rate is 35%). The minimum exempt 
level is about twice the per capita income which, unlike developed countries, takes the low medium-
income families out of the income tax net; b) labor income is also taxed with social contributions that 
return some services to formal workers although most benefits are not a direct function of the tax 
paid by employers and employees. Therefore, they are a tax on labor income at a proportional rate; c) 
firms’ profits are taxed at a 35% flat rate and dividends are exempt. There is no indexation for 
inflation. There is a 1% tax on business assets that is integrated to the business income tax (firms can 
credit it against their liabilities in the income tax). It acts as a minimum tax on income. There is a 
similar tax for individuals on their properties and some financial assets (Impuesto a los Bienes 
Personales), but it is a final tax that cannot be credited against the personal income tax. The rate 
structure for this tax on personal wealth is progressive and the marginal rate is 0.75%. Only 
mortgages are allowed to be deducted from assets.  
Other taxes with important contributions to federal revenues are: a) a tax on financial transactions 
at a combined rate of 1.2%, with an exemption for deposits used to pay monthly salaries.27 This tax is 
similar to a turnover tax. It distorts relative prices and penalizes domestic producers that cannot shift 
it to international prices; b) imports pay duties according to the common external tariff agreed on 
Mercosur. All exports pay taxes, but at different rates that go from 4.8% for manufacturing to 37.5% 
for soybeans. Exports taxes are a tax on production and a subsidy to local consumption.  
                                               
26 The federal financial transaction tax that was reintroduced in 2001 falls on a similar tax base than the provincial 
cascade tax. This is an example of a tax externality not properly coordinated between the different levels of government. 
27 Both debits and credits into bank accounts are taxed at 0.6%. One third of the rate on bank credits can be used as a tax 
credit for income tax purposes. 
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With the exception of import duties and social security contributions, all revenues are shared with 
the provincial governments, but the primary distribution is different across taxes. It is lower for taxes 
on exports (only revenues received from exports of soybeans are shared with the provinces), and for 
the tax on financial transactions.  
 
2.b. Taxes collected by Provinces and Local Governments 
 
As founders of the federal government, provinces delegated the collection of some taxes but 
retained taxing power. Municipalities collect taxes and user fees, but most “fees” are hidden taxes 
because they are not related to the services provided. Most revenues are obtained from a tax on sales 
(that mimics in most cases the provincial tax) and from taxes on real estate (that mimic the provincial 
one).  
Each province and most local governments have their own tax administration department or 
agency (either centralized or decentralized). Some provinces agree to share information with the 
federal  tax agency, but there are no joint audits.   
Table 4 shows the composition of provincial revenues in 2009 expressed as a fraction of the local 
GDPs.28 Data for the provinces are also grouped according to their level of development and their 
population density. The importance of the state participation in the economy is negatively correlated 
with development and with population density. This is a consequence of the high regional 
distributional component of federal transfers that favors the poor and sparsely populated provinces. 
For example the automatic federal transfers averaged only 3.8% of the GDP of the advanced and 
populated provinces, but jumped to 26.52% of GDP for the poorest provinces with low density 
(column 12). On one extreme there was the City of Buenos Aires with total revenues of 6% of its 
GDP and on the other was Formosa with 59% of its GDP.29   
There is much less variation in the collection of Own-source tax revenues (from 3.8% of GDP to 
4.9% for the averages of the 4 groups). This is especially the case for the most important tax of the 
provincial governments, Ingresos Brutos (the cascade sales tax, with revenues that average 2.9% in 
the group of poor and sparsely populated provinces to 3.7% of GDP in the richer and highly 
populated provinces) and also for the stamp tax (with revenues of about 0.4% of the local GDPs in 
the four groups). Real Estate tax collections expressed as a fraction of the provincial GDPs are higher 
                                               
28 The weighted average is estimated as the total collection in pesos of the 24 provinces divided by the nominal National 
GDP. The sum of the 24 provincial GDPs has minor differences with the estimate of the National GDP. 
29 Estimates of provincial GDPs are not as reliable as the estimate of the Federal GDP. 
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for provinces with high population density, suggesting that urban properties account for most of the 
collections of this tax. 
 
Table 4: Provincial Revenues as % of Provincial GDP as of 2009
Cascade 
Tax
Real State 
Tax
Tax on 
Motor 
Vehicles
Stamp 
Tax
Other 
taxes
Total Own-
Source 
Taxes Royalties
Other 
Non-tax 
revenues
Total Non-
tax 
revenues
Capital 
revenues 
and other
Total Own-
source 
Revenues
Automatic 
Transfers
Discretional 
Transfers
Total 
Federal 
Transfers
Total 
Provincial 
Revenues
1 2 3 4 5 6 = 1+2+3+4+5 7 8 9 = 7+8 10 11 = 6+9+10 12 13 14 = 12+13 15=11+14
Ciudad de Buenos Aires 3.55% 0.56% 0.43% 0.31% 0.06% 4.90% 0.00% 0.24% 0.24% 0.06% 5.20% 0.57% 0.12% 0.69% 5.89%
Buenos Aires 3.91% 0.36% 0.35% 0.34% 0.36% 5.32% 0.00% 0.21% 0.21% 0.10% 5.63% 3.80% 1.66% 5.45% 11.09%
Catamarca 1.75% 0.10% 0.16% 0.19% 0.00% 2.20% 0.68% 2.32% 3.01% 0.43% 5.64% 18.96% 1.51% 20.47% 26.11%
Córdoba 3.72% 0.43% 0.21% 0.24% 0.00% 4.59% 0.00% 0.71% 0.71% 0.27% 5.58% 7.80% 2.00% 9.80% 15.38%
Corrientes 1.59% 0.11% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 1.96% 0.10% 0.11% 0.21% 0.32% 2.49% 14.31% 1.49% 15.80% 18.30%
Chaco 3.08% 0.03% 0.00% 0.41% 0.69% 4.21% 0.00% 0.42% 0.42% 0.40% 5.03% 29.56% 11.98% 41.54% 46.57%
Chubut 2.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 0.09% 3.19% 6.49% 1.72% 8.21% 0.70% 12.10% 6.01% 1.81% 7.81% 19.91%
Entre Ríos 2.55% 0.64% 0.42% 0.38% 0.48% 4.47% 0.88% 0.25% 1.12% 0.46% 6.06% 15.32% 4.49% 19.81% 25.87%
Formosa 2.47% 0.04% 0.00% 0.33% 0.15% 2.99% 0.27% 0.70% 0.98% 0.30% 4.26% 45.75% 9.29% 55.04% 59.31%
Jujuy 2.40% 0.12% 0.00% 0.30% 0.21% 3.03% 0.02% 0.34% 0.36% 0.32% 3.70% 22.39% 11.44% 33.84% 37.54%
La Pampa 3.77% 0.99% 0.56% 1.03% 0.09% 6.45% 1.13% 0.64% 1.77% 2.37% 10.59% 19.67% 3.99% 23.66% 34.25%
La Rioja 2.10% 0.07% 0.27% 0.07% 0.00% 2.51% 0.00% 0.19% 0.19% 1.75% 4.44% 29.42% 15.90% 45.32% 49.76%
Mendoza 3.08% 0.37% 0.43% 0.48% 0.03% 4.38% 2.05% 0.86% 2.92% 0.50% 7.80% 8.57% 1.95% 10.52% 18.32%
Misiones 2.80% 0.14% 0.04% 0.26% 0.02% 3.25% 0.46% 0.25% 0.71% 0.40% 4.36% 11.98% 4.14% 16.12% 20.49%
Neuquén 3.24% 0.21% 0.00% 0.39% 0.00% 3.83% 7.37% 5.05% 12.42% 1.43% 17.68% 5.30% 1.24% 6.54% 24.22%
Río Negro 3.22% 0.24% 0.46% 0.36% 0.01% 4.29% 2.28% 0.90% 3.19% 0.33% 7.81% 12.20% 2.55% 14.75% 22.56%
Salta 4.65% 0.05% 0.00% 0.63% 0.33% 5.67% 2.93% 0.60% 3.52% 0.59% 9.78% 21.59% 4.86% 26.44% 36.23%
San Juan 2.80% 0.31% 0.40% 0.31% 0.64% 4.46% 0.60% 0.63% 1.22% 1.19% 6.88% 24.46% 4.89% 29.35% 36.23%
San Luis 3.94% 0.27% 0.20% 0.41% 0.03% 4.85% 0.00% 0.35% 0.35% 0.64% 5.85% 18.32% 1.80% 20.13% 25.98%
Santa Cruz 3.97% 0.01% 0.00% 0.57% 0.00% 4.55% 8.78% 1.71% 10.49% 7.54% 22.59% 10.75% 11.29% 22.04% 44.63%
Santa Fe 2.92% 0.32% 0.00% 0.48% 0.02% 3.74% 0.00% 0.12% 0.12% 0.30% 4.16% 7.35% 1.29% 8.64% 12.80%
Santiago del Estero 2.38% 0.20% 0.10% 0.37% 0.53% 3.58% 0.02% 0.32% 0.33% 0.59% 4.51% 30.40% 9.17% 39.57% 44.08%
Tierra del Fuego 3.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.84% 4.39% 3.15% 1.70% 4.85% 0.72% 9.96% 11.94% 3.17% 15.11% 25.08%
Tucumán 7.05% 0.89% 0.39% 0.92% 0.20% 9.43% 0.00% 0.97% 0.97% 0.68% 11.08% 25.85% 7.71% 33.57% 44.64%
High Development and 
High Population Density 3.65% 0.42% 0.33% 0.34% 0.19% 4.92% 0.09% 0.29% 0.37% 0.14% 5.44% 3.80% 1.21% 5.01% 10.45%
High Development and 
Low Population Density 3.33% 0.19% 0.13% 0.43% 0.10% 4.18% 5.06% 2.25% 7.31% 1.76% 13.26% 10.00% 3.17% 13.16% 26.42%
Low Development and 
High Population Density 3.08% 0.34% 0.16% 0.40% 0.25% 4.22% 0.33% 0.35% 0.67% 0.43% 5.33% 18.29% 5.85% 24.14% 29.47%
Low Development and 
Low Population Density 2.88% 0.14% 0.15% 0.36% 0.31% 3.83% 0.99% 0.85% 1.84% 0.75% 6.41% 26.52% 6.52% 33.04% 39.45%
Weighted average 3.53% 0.38% 0.29% 0.35% 0.19% 4.74% 0.59% 0.49% 1.08% 0.34% 6.16% 6.767% 2.06% 8.83% 14.99%
Simple average 3.21% 0.27% 0.18% 0.40% 0.20% 4.26% 1.55% 0.89% 2.44% 0.93% 7.63% 16.76% 4.99% 21.75% 29.38%
Coefficient of variation 0.344 1.004 1.068 0.547 1.290 0.361 1.630 1.202 1.384 1.615 0.612 0.633 0.866 0.642 0.469
Minimum 1.59% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 1.96% 0.00% 0.11% 0.12% 0.06% 2.49% 0.57% 0.12% 0.69% 5.89%
Maximun 7.05% 0.99% 0.56% 1.03% 0.84% 9.43% 8.78% 5.05% 12.42% 7.54% 22.59% 45.75% 15.90% 55.04% 59.31%
Source: Authors' calculations based on Mecon and provincial Bureau of Statistics
High Development and High Population Density are: City of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza and Santa Fe. High Development and Low Population Density: Chubut, La Pampa, Neuquen, Rio Negro, San Luis, Santa Cruz 
and Tierra del Fuego. Low Development and High Population Density are: Corrientes , Chaco, Entre Rios, Jujuy, Misiones  and Tucumán. Low Development and Low Density are: Catamarca, Formosa, La Rioja, Salta, San Juan and 
Santiago del Estero.
 
i. The turnover tax (Ingresos Brutos)30 
 
The Argentine provinces had used a tax on gross sales for years (Impuesto a las Actividades 
Lucrativas). When the VAT was introduced in 1975 at the Federal level they agreed to eliminate the 
tax and this enabled them to receive a fraction of the collections of the VAT. However, under a new 
name (Ingresos Brutos) the cascade tax was reintroduced probably as a response to the high deficits 
that were pervasive at that time at all levels of government. In the early 1980’s there was one failed 
attempt to reduce the cascade of the tax and in the early 1990’s the Federal government provided 
some incentives to provinces to reduce the cascade under the umbrella of two Fiscal Agreements 
                                               
30 This section is a summary of Artana et al (2011). 
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(1992 and 1993). Provinces were supposed to exempt primary activities, manufacturing, construction 
and financial services. About 60% of the provinces complied with the exemptions on primary 
activities, manufacturing and construction but only a few extended the exemptions to financial 
services. During the 2000’s the Fiscal Agreements were abandoned and most provinces taxed those 
activities again.  
Some provinces reduce the rates for small firms and grant other exemptions either for 
development reasons (e.g. manufacturing located in industrial zones) or for distributional purposes 
(e.g. lower rates on some foods, transport and medicines). The fiscal loss for these special regimes is 
substantial (e.g. about 23% of collections in 2010 in the province of Buenos Aires).31 
The weighted average tax rate32 increased from 1.60% in 2002 to 1.68% in 2010. Although there 
is a positive relationship between the rate and the collections, there are important differences in 
collections for relatively similar rates. This may respond to different exemptions that were not 
considered in the estimate of the weighted average tax rate or to differences in the enforcement of the 
tax (either differences in evasion or different contributions from the easier-to-collect sources like the 
money obtained from large taxpayers or from withholdings). The recent evolution of collections 
differed from one province to another. On one extreme, there is a group of 7 provinces (Buenos 
Aires, Chubut, La Pampa, Neuquen, San Luis, Santa Cruz and Tucuman) with large increases 
between 1993 and 2009 (over 90% of the growth observed in their GDPs), and on the other extreme, 
there are two provinces (City of Buenos Aires and Mendoza) with increase of less than 30% over 
GDP growth. 
More recently, the distortions became even worse. For example: 
 The dispersion in legal tax rates for the same economic activity among different provinces is 
important. Table 5 summarizes the findings of IERAL and IARAF, two institutions that 
estimate the effective legal tax rates of taxes on gross sales for the 24 provinces and a sample 
of municipalities.33 It follows that there is a high dispersion across provinces of the rates for 
                                               
31 The province of Buenos Aires estimates the fiscal loss of tax exemptions and reduced rates in own-source taxes. For 
2010 in Ingresos Brutos 65% of the estimated loss came from the exemption granted to small and medium size firms and 
35% from reduced rates and exemptions. 
32 The average rate for each province is estimated using the shares of each economic sector in the provincial Gross 
Domestic Product and taking into consideration the general exemptions (but not those exemptions granted to specific 
firms like those located in industrial parks). Therefore, the rates shown in Table 5 may overstate the rates charged in 
practice. 
33 These institutions follow since 2002 a sample of 100 municipalities that represent 60% of the population of the 23 
provinces with local governments. Seventy percent of these municipalities have a tax on gross sales similar to the 
provincial tax. The other 30% uses the number of employees, the size of the shop or other criteria to calculate the tax.  
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primary activities, manufacturing and construction in the provincial tax on gross sales. For 
utilities, commerce and financial intermediation the dispersion is lower, but average rates are 
higher.  
 
Table 5: Dispersion of Tax Rates  in Provincial and Municipal Cascade Sales Taxes. By Economic Activity and Province in 2006
Provincial 
Turnover 
Tax
Municipal 
Tax
Provincial 
Turnover 
Tax
Municipal 
Tax
Provincial 
Turnover 
Tax
Municipal 
Tax
Provincial 
Turnover 
Tax
Municipal 
Tax
Provincial 
Turnover 
Tax
Municipal 
Tax
Average rate in 24 provinces 0.49% 0.47% 0.78% 0.39% 2.38% 0.69% 2.67% 0.90% 2.69% 0.85%
Minimum rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.60% 0.05% 1.60% 0.25% 0.00% 0.05%
Maximun rate 2.00% 3.40% 2.30% 1.40% 3.40% 2.60% 4.40% 2.10% 4.40% 3.00%
Coefficient of variation 1.27 1.54 0.97 0.77 0.31 0.88 0.22 0.48 0.39 0.85
Source: Authors' calculations based on IARAF (2009) and IERAL (2006).
Primary
Manufacturing & 
Construction Located in 
Same Province Utilities
Commerce, 
Restaurants & Hotels
Financial 
Intermediation
 
 By increasing the tax burden on primary, manufacturing, construction and financial services 
that are used as inputs in other economic activities the cascade has surely increased. For 
example, the average rate on primary activities increased from 33% of the average rate of 
Ingresos Brutos in 2003 to 36% in 2010, and for manufacturing it rose from 50% of the 
average in 2003 to 60% in 2010.  
 21 of the 24 provinces have a higher tax on manufacturers that are located in other provinces 
than in manufacturers located on their territory. The difference in rates is substantial. For 
example in the province of Buenos Aires is 3% compared with 0,57%, in Cordoba 3,50% 
compared with 0,46%, in the City of Buenos Aires 3% compared with 0.63% and in Santa Fe 
1,35% compared with 0%.34 Provinces can enforce this through the Convenio Multilateral 
that distributes among provinces the collections of large taxpayers that have sales in more 
than one jurisdiction. The difference in rates increases the cost for a firm located in the 
province that purchases inputs in other provinces, and is a sort of internal barrier to trade 
because a firm “saves” in taxes by purchasing from local manufacturers.  
 Withholdings became more pervasive.35 There are over 60 different regimes for withholdings 
in the 24 provinces. As most of them are additive there is a non-negligible probability of 
                                               
34 See IARAF (2010 a) that estimates that the weighted average tax rate for the 24 provinces for manufacturers located 
in other provinces  more than doubles the rate for manufacturers located in the province. 
35 In 2010 withholdings accounted for 54% of total collections of Ingresos Brutos in the City of Buenos Aires and for 
83% in the province of Buenos Aires. Firms paying through the Multilateral Agreement contributed with 38% in the 
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suffering chronic excess withholdings that provinces are reluctant to reimburse. Moreover, as 
the regional distribution of purchases is likely to be different from the regional distribution of 
sales, many firms may have a credit with some provinces although on the aggregate they may 
have a balanced position. Only a few provinces permit the transfer of excess withholdings to 
other taxpayers.    
The fraction of provincial and municipal sales taxes that falls on the producers of tradables is 
better thought of as a tax on production given that Argentina is a price-taker in world markets. 
Therefore this fraction of the tax is likely to fall on income of labor and capital (including land). The 
tax that falls on the non-traded part of goods and services sold in the domestic market is a tax on 
consumption at variable rates that depend on the cascade and the value added by the different stages 
on non-tradable production. With information of collections by sector of some of the large provinces, 
it can be concluded that on one extreme retail activities (including services) with no cascade effect 
may account for about 30% of total revenues, on the other extreme primary activities and 
manufacturing with maximum cascade effect may account for about 20%, and the remaining 50% is 
obtained from services (financial, transport) or construction that have a mix of final sales and 
intermediate sales. Therefore, the cascade is a problem in the tax as most of its revenues are obtained 
from activities that are inputs of other activities. 
ii. Tasa de Seguridad e Higiene 
 
 Most municipalities have a tax on gross sales that mimics the provincial turnover tax, although at 
lower rates (see Table 5). However, the dispersion in rates for the same economic activity is usually 
higher for the municipal tax than for the provincial tax.36  
 When municipalities opt to use another base37, the tax (expressed as a percentage of sales) is 
usually lower.38   
The weighted average tax rate for the municipalities that hit gross sales also increased from 
0.58% of sales in 2003 to the above mentioned 0.67% in 2010.39 
                                                                                                                                                        
City and 13% in the province of Buenos Aires. Local taxpayers contribute with less than 10% of total revenues 
suggesting that most are small firms.   
36But there is more uniformity across sectors e.g., the average tax rate for commerce is twice the rate of primary 
activities, while in Ingresos Brutos it is 5.4 times bigger.   
37 Generally number of employees or size of the shop where the activity takes place. 
38 Average estimates from IARAF (2010) are 0.23% of sales compared to 0.67% for the 70% municipalities that tax 
gross sales. 
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 The economic analysis for the most frequent tax base is similar to the provincial tax on gross 
sales. When they opt to tax employment the analysis is similar to a tax on labor (likely to reduce 
formal employment and labor income in an open economy), and when they opt to use the size of the 
shop it looks similar to a tax on real estate (see below). 
iii. Taxes on urban and rural real estate 
 
  During the 1980’s and 1990’s some provinces shifted the collection on urban real estate and on 
automobiles to their local governments. All provinces calculate the tax on the assessed value of 
properties. In building the cadastre provinces usually rely on the characteristics of the property and 
their value. However, the valuation of old properties is not updated regularly, with the exception of 
their most visible characteristics.40 Table 6 shows for selected provinces that the “typical” structure 
of the tax is: a) progressive rates for urban properties; b) unused urban land is taxed at higher rates; 
and c) tax rates on rural land are proportional in some provinces and progressive in others. There are 
subjective exemptions and also variations according to the location of the property. The tax on real 
estate in the most developed provinces is about 0.5% of market values. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
39 The increase may be overstated because the figures for 2003 published by IERAL (2004) apparently bundle together 
all municipalities and it is likely that those using other bases than sales also had a lower rate at that time.  
40 A Federal Law (26209/07) was enacted creating the Cadastre Federal Council integrated by all the provincial 
cadastres (i.e. a single Cadastre for all the country), but no advancement was achieved yet. 
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Table 6: Structure of the Tax on Real Estate in Selected Provinces
Minimum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Maximum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Difference 
by zone 
(either by 
rate or 
valuation)
Minimum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Maximum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Difference by 
zone (either by 
rate or 
valuation)
Minimum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Maximum 
rate on 
assessed 
value
Difference by 
zone (either 
by rate or 
valuation)
City of Buenos Aires /1 0.58% 2.16% Yes 5.58% 10.58% Yes
Province of Buenos Aires /2 0.38% 1.62% Yes 0.38% 1.69% Yes 1.01% 2.51% Yes
Córdoba - Río Tercero /3 /4 /5 0.48% 0.94% Yes 0.74% 1.32% Yes 1.20% 1.20% Yes
La Pampa /4 /5 /6 0.50% 1.40% No 2.00% 2.00% Yes 1.20% 1.20% Yes
Neuquén /4 0.55% 1.62% No 2.80% 2.80% No 1.20% 2.50% Yes
Santa Fe /4 0.49% 1.22% Yes na na na 0.65% 2.35% Yes
Entre Ríos 0.60% 2.80% No 3.80% 5.50% No 0.80% 2.30% No
San Luis /7 /8 0.60% 1.20% Yes 1.80% 1.80% No 0.90% 1.50% No
La Rioja /5 /9 0.20% 0.70% No 1.50% 1.50% No 1.00% 1.00% No
Misiones /4 0.60% 1.20% Yes 1.50% 1.50% Yes 1.20% 1.20% Yes
Chubut /10 0.40% 0.40% Yes 0.42% 0.48% Yes 1.20% 4.80% No
Río Negro /4 /11 0.51% 1.00% No 1.01% 2.00% No 0.51% 1.00% No
San Juan /4 0.47% 0.75% No 2.55% 3.00% No 2.55% 3.00% No
6/ Awards for good contributor: deductions in between 5 and 10%, according to the number of years without breaches.
7/ Awards for good contributor: deductions in between 10 and 20%, according to the number of years without breaches.
8/ When improvements in properties, the rates on the increased tax base will be applied in 60% (urban land) and 80% (rural land).
9/ Properties with no fiscal valuation pay a flat tax of $37.5
11/ A surcharge of 50% has been set  on properties with absent owners.
Source: author’s calculations based on provincial taxcodes
1/ Includes all contributions on real state: for street cleaning and public lighting, for repairing of streets and to expand the subway network. The combined rate cannot exceed 1% of market value.
3/ Cordoba establishes two separate property taxes, collected by the province and the municipalities. In Rio Tercero, properties located in corners contribute an extra 20%, considering the shorter frontage.
10/ Taxing on rural land is power of the provincial government, and on urban land of the municipalities. A third category of land, denominated “urban enlarging and and valleys”, provides aliquots of between 
0.01 and 1.50%.
2/ In order to establish the taxable base for Urban property tax, it showld be applied the coefficient of 0.9 on the assigned fiscal value. 
Urban properties with construction Urban land Rural land
No rural land
4/ For Urban properties with construction and Urban land, it has been set an annual minimum tax in La Pampa ($21), Neuquen ($25), Santa Fe ($10), Misiones ($5.5), Rio Negro ($37.5), San Juan ($25), Cordoba 
($20) and Rio Tercero, Cordoba (between $17 and $
5/ For Urban properties with construction, it has been set a fixed additional amount in La Rioja (between $13 and $69) and Rio Tercero, Cordoba (between $ 3.5 and $11.5 for each frontside metre long). For 
Urban land, in La Rioja (between $13 and $87.5) an
 
As happens in other Latin-American countries the collection of taxes on property is lower than 
the bills issued.41   
 Property may be taxed directly or indirectly through taxes on the income generated by it. 
In Argentina the imputed income from own houses is not taxed with the income tax. Therefore, 
taxing the stock of real estate may correct for this bias. Moreover, as the property tax usually falls on 
the value of the assets it is neutral with regards to the source of financing while the income tax has a 
bias towards debt.42 However, as the property tax also falls on houses for rental and on business real 
estate there is no correction of the distortions. The Federal tax on personal assets also falls on the 
                                               
41 See De Cesare and Lazo Martin (2008) for a review of property taxes in Latin America. 
42 In Argentina equity is taxed once and debt is virtually tax free because the returns of most forms of savings are not 
taxed at the savers level. In fact, as there is inflation of 20-25% debt-financed assets are de facto subsidized. See 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a proof. Families can also deduct the interest paid on mortgages up to Arg$ 20.000 a 
year (about US$ 5.000).  
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value of these properties and the transaction of properties is usually taxed with the stamp tax. Table 7 
summarizes the taxation on property in Argentina.  
 Therefore, the justification for the property tax43 does not lie in a correction (albeit imperfect) of 
distortions in the taxation of property income. For an efficiency point of view, with the tax at the 
provincial level (with few exceptions) there is not much justification as a user fee either, at least for 
the large provinces. 
 
Table 7: Taxation of property assets and their income in Argentina
Debt-Financed Equity-Financed Debt-Financed Equity-Financed Debt-Financed Equity-Financed Debt-Financed Equity-Financed
Own House Tp + Tpf Tp + Tpf Subsidy with ceiling No tax Exempt Exempt Ts Ts
House for Rental Tp + Tpf Tp + Tpf
Subsidy with no 
ceiling because of 
inflation
 > Ty because of 
depreciation at 
historical cost Exempt Exempt Ts Ts
Business real state Tp + Taf Tp + Taf
Subsidy with no 
ceiling because of 
inflation
 > Ty because of 
depreciation at 
historical cost
Ty on nominal 
change in value
Ty on nominal 
change in value Ts Ts
Agricultural land Tp + Taf Tp + Taf
Subsidy with no 
ceiling because of 
inflation
 > Ty because of 
depreciation at 
historical cost
Ty on nominal 
change in value
Ty on nominal 
change in value Ts Ts
1/ The Tax on Business Assets is creditable with the tax on business income. 
Source: Authors's estimates
Taxation of assets 1/ Taxation of income flow Taxation of capital gains Taxation of transactions
Notes: Tp: Provincial Tax on on urban land and bui ldings. Tpl: Provincial tax on rural  land. Ts. Provincial Stamp tax. Ty: Federal Income tax. Tpf: Federal tax on Personal Assets. Taf: Federal Tax on Business 
Assets
 
 The generalized use of a progressive-rate structure suggests the search for equity and fairness. 
However, by taxing only real estate assets and with different criteria by province, it is not evident 
that vertical and horizontal equity concerns are correctly addressed.  
iv. Taxes on motor vehicles 
 
 Many countries tax the purchase of a motor vehicle, its registration and its use. A possible 
explanation for this combination of taxes is the attempt to mitigate the risk of climate change. In fact, 
European countries are moving towards differentiating the rates of tax according to carbon 
emissions44 in order to encourage consumers to purchase more efficient vehicles.45 For example, in 
Germany passengers cars registered after July 1, 2009 pay an annual tax of Euros 1.84 per every 25 
cm3 of cylinder capacity, while cars registered before that date run by gasoline pay a tax of Euros 
                                               
43 Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) make a comparative analysis of the advantages of collecting a property tax at 
the sub-national or at the national level of government. 
44 For a summary of car taxation in the EU see ACEA (2010). 
45 Fullerton and West (2002) proved that a single tax on gasoline use combined with a single tax per unit of engine size 
and a single subsidy to pollution control equipment are a first best policy if consumers are homogeneous. When 
consumers have different tastes (e.g. about engine size or driven miles) one would need a different tax rate for each 
consumer (which is not possible). In a second-best framework they prove that under plausible assumptions the tax on 
gasoline should increase and the tax on engines should decrease if consumers preferences for “miles” (i.e. driving more) 
are positively correlated with their preference for engine size (i.e larger engines), which is likely to be the case. 
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6.75 to 25.36 per 100 cm3 (those running on diesel pay about 100% more). In other European 
countries they either use a registration tax based on fuel consumption or cylinder capacity or on 
estimates of CO2 emissions. Only five countries use the price as the base of the tax (Denmark, 
Finland, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia), but in four of them it is combined with some other of 
the criteria mentioned before. Taxes on ownership are usually based on cylinder capacity, CO2 
emissions or the weight of the vehicle (especially for commercial vehicles). 
In Argentina, the tax on automobiles may reach almost 4% of the value of the car in the richer 
provinces (see Table 8), plus 1% for registration fee.46 Some provinces charge a proportional tax on 
the value of the car and others have a progressive rate structure. Commercial vehicles are usually 
taxed at lower rates. Many provinces exempt old cars for equity reasons even though that contradicts 
fuel efficiency and environmental objectives. 
 The taxation of vehicles in Argentina has several problems. Taxing according to the value of the 
car is difficult to justify from an environmental point of view. Price is unlikely to be correlated with 
CO2 emissions or fuel consumption, and while the size of the engine is likely to lead to a higher 
price, there are many other attributes that will be taxed by using the value of the car as the tax base. 
In fact, a higher price is usually associated with improvements in the quality of the car (e.g. safety); 
therefore, the Argentine tax will end being a tax on quality. 
For the same reasons mentioned in the discussion about the real estate tax, using a tax on vehicles 
as an instrument to achieve an improvement in the distribution of income is questionable. A tax on 
all the taxpayers’ assets (like the federal tax on personal assets) is surely better. Even worse, as the 
tax rates are different across provinces this creates another obstacle to horizontal equity.47  
The lower taxation on commercial vehicles is difficult to justify for environmental reasons or for 
equity reasons, although it may have a rationale to avoid additional efficiency costs since commercial 
vehicles are an input of production. However, in the case of buses and trucks it adds to subsidized 
prices on urban transport that are pervasive in most Argentine cities.    
 
 
                                               
46 Argentina has a centralized Register at the federal government that serves all provinces. For registration of a new 
vehicle the owner has to pay a fee of 1% of the market value of the car plus some lump-sum fees for the emission of the 
certificate that validates the ownership. The value of cars is updated regularly and is similar to the market price. When 
an old car is sold, the Register charges another 1% of the value of the car for the transfer of ownership. 
47 Some variation in rates may be accepted so that the sub-national governments have autonomy, but the differences that 
exist in Argentina on a mobile tax base like cars are relatively large.  
20 
Table 8: Structure of the Tax on Motor Vehicles in Selected Provinces (% of Market Values)
Minimum 
Rate 
Maximun 
Rate Exemption for Old Cars
Taxis and 
Vans Trucks Buses
City of Buenos Aires  1/ 3.52% 3.52% Yes more than 12 years 2.53% 1.38% 1.27%
Province of Buenos Aires 3.00% 3.90% Transferred to municipalities 3.00% 1.50% 1.50%
Cordoba 1.20% 1.50% Yes, before 1998 1.20% 1.07% 1.07%
Mendoza 2.30% 2.90% Pay minimum fee of US$ 12
San Luis 2.50% 2.50% Pay minimum fee according to weight 2.50% 1.25% 1.25%
Santa Fe 2.00% 2.00% Pay minimum fee of US$ 3 0.50% 1.50% 0.50%
Tucuman 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 1.00%
La Pampa 2.00% 3.00% Yes, before 1990 2.30% 1.25% 2.10%
Catamarca 2.00% 2.00% Pay minimum fee of US$ 10 2.00% 1.50% 1.50%
Jujuy 1.00% 1.00% Pay minimun fee of US$ 7 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Neuquén -San Martín de los 
Andes- 3.50% 3.50% Yes, more than 20 years 2.30% 1.60% 1.60%
Entre Ríos 1.80% 2.30% Pay minimum fee of US$ 7 2.00% 1.50% 0.50%
Misiones 2.00% 2.00%
Older than 16 years pay a minimum fee of 
US$ 5 0.80% 0.80%
1/ Includes a surcharge of 10% for the expansion of the subway network.
2/ Market values are estimated by the National Register based on information provided by insurance companies and car manufacturers. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on provincial tax codes.
Taxation of Passenger Cars Taxation of Commercial Vehicles
 
v. Stamp tax on some contracts 
 
This is a cascade tax on some contracts that differs from one province to another. The City of 
Buenos Aires reintroduced the tax that it had abolished during the 1990’s. In many provinces most 
revenues are obtained from real estate transactions and from financial and insurance contracts.  
The 24 provinces collected in 2009 0.36% of the country’s GDP, but in some provinces the 
collections (expressed as % of the local GDP) are much higher. For example, it was 1.03% in La 
Pampa, 0.9% in Tucuman and about 0.6% in Salta and Santa Cruz.  
vi. Other revenues  
 
Some provinces also tax labor or utilities’ sales and the twelve provinces that did not transfer 
their pay-as-you go pension system collect labor taxes on public employees. All provinces and 
municipalities collect user fees, although it is not clear whether they are set on a cost-recovery basis. 
User fees are related to different services like the use of public cemeteries, court fees, road levies, 
driver licenses, traffic violations, etcetera. 
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Resource-rich provinces collect royalties from mining, electricity and the production of crude oil 
and natural gas.48 Most revenues from royalties are obtained from the production of crude oil and 
natural gas. The rate used to be 12% on the value of production, but recently some provinces agreed 
on different rates in bilateral negotiations with private firms to extend the concessions. In mining, the 
royalty is usually 3%.  
The collection of royalties should have minimum administration costs because it is relatively 
easy to monitor output while the incentives to underestimate prices at the well can be controlled by 
the provinces by looking at market prices. However, there have been some problems with the 
estimate of the price discount that lower-quality petroleum carries in the market. More recently, 
provinces have relied on private firms to audit the price and quantity declared by oil and natural gas 
companies.  
Most provinces share the revenues obtained from royalties with their local governments with 
some regional distribution objective by allocating a fraction of revenues even to the municipalities 
that have no production. 
Provinces and municipalities where oil and natural gas production takes place, also include oil 
companies into the net of their cascade sales taxes and the base is usually the same used for the 
computation of royalties. 
 
3. The impact of the 2001-2002 crisis on the level and composition of 
provincial revenues 
 
Previous studies49 have found that the provincial cascade sales tax is more pro-cyclical than federal 
transfers. It is important to validate this result because it suggests that the problem of procyclical 
revenues may have aggravated in recent years due to the increase in the collections of this tax. If this 
were the case, a reform of own-source revenues or proposals to reduce the vertical imbalance would 
need to include tax bases less sensitive to the economic cycle, or to be tied with credible fiscal 
responsibility laws. 
Own-source provincial revenues and its composition changed during the last decade. It is 
necessary to understand the main explanations for these changes to make proposals of reform. 
                                               
48 Mc Lure (2003) argues that there are good economic reasons for oil revenues to be centralized: the tax base is volatile 
and usually concentrated in a few regions of the country, there might be a temptation to reduce other local taxes or to 
undertake unprofitable public investment, and the compensation of losses for dry holes is not easy at the local level. See 
also, Fidelino and Ter-Minassian (2009). 
49 See Sturzenegger and Werner (2006). 
22 
Provincial revenues depend on: a) local variables such as the evolution of the provincial economic 
activity and its structure, the degree of informality, poverty and income distribution; b) exogenous 
variables for the province such as the prices of natural resources (oil and natural gas, electricity), or 
automatic federal transfers that are calculated using a formula introduced in 1988 and that was never 
changed since then; c) political economy variables that influence the distribution of discretionary 
transfers among provinces, and d) local decisions, e.g changes in tax rates or the decision not to use 
the same effort to collect a tax.  
For example, in the case of the property tax, in an inflationary context it is necessary to update 
the values (tax base) of the different properties to avoid a deterioration of revenues in real terms. This 
indexation of the tax base is automatic in other taxes, such as the cascade sales tax and the 
automobile tax. The adjustment might be costly (as in the “menu cost” literature) or it might be 
politically exhausting. For taxpayers, in general the property tax is more visible than the cascade 
sales tax; in addition changes in the property value have tax externalities, since the valuation is the 
basis for the tax on wealth at the national level; and finally, there might be political economy issues 
in provinces were property tax is shared with the municipal governments (i.e. the provincial 
government has to pay the political cost of changing the property value, but it will not appropriate all 
the benefits). In this context, governors and provincial congress might have opted not to make these 
“visible” changes and rely more on federal transfers or on “less-visible” taxes such as the cascade 
sales tax that is automatically linked to inflation and economic activity.  
Another factor that might have affected the own-source revenue effort and the sub-national tax 
structure is the growing importance of discretionary transfers and the increase (in real terms) in 
royalties and automatic transfers. On the one hand, the increase in transfers increases sub-national 
government tax revenue as a share of local GDP for some provinces, because it allows the province 
to consume more (i.e. the provincial GNI is above its GDP) increasing the tax base for several taxes 
(such as cascade sales tax, automobile tax, real estate tax). Also important might be the nature of the 
transfer, whether it is automatic or discretionary, and whether it is interpreted as temporary or 
permanent. 
On the other hand, transfers might distort the incentives of local governments to collect their own 
taxes, reducing their tax effort, particularly those that are more visible for the taxpayers and this can 
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be interpreted as a variant of the flypaper effect,50 but related to the revenue effort, i.e., on the 
revenue side.  
As regards the expenditure of sub-national governments, there is a vast literature analyzing the 
flypaper effect. This effect results when a dollar of exogenous grants-in-aid leads to significantly 
greater public spending than an equivalent dollar of citizen income (i.e. money sticks where it hits), 
Inman (2008). There has been a discussion in the literature whether this anomaly is due to 
econometric problems. The main concern is the misclassification of grants as exogenous aid 
(endogeneity of grants), that may produce biased estimators. The empirical literature on the flypaper 
effect is large, and in general when endogeneity issues are controlled for, the result holds, suggesting 
that the flypaper effect appears to be a real phenomenon.51 The natural explanation of this effect is 
political economy or the recognition that own-source revenues create distortions and federal transfers 
do not (at least from the recipient government’s point of view, Vegh and Vuletin, 2010).52 Some 
authors argue that the effect could be a result of voters’ asymmetric information or fiscal illusion (see 
for instance Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), Oates (1999), Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal 
(1982) and Hines and Thaler (1995)). Inman (2008) suggests that rather than an anomaly, the 
flypaper effect is best seen as an outcome of political institutions and the associated incentives of 
elected officials. 
Following the analysis of Vegh and Vuletin (2010) as it is logical for sub-national governments 
to spend more from grants than from additional distortionary own-source revenues, it is also logical 
that some provinces may opt to use the transfers to finance a reduction of their own taxes to reduce 
distortions or political costs.53  
Summing up, revenues and their composition may be affected by the size of federal transfers, by 
asymmetric responses to external shocks and political factors,54 or by the need to reduce deficits.  
                                               
50 Baldrich (2010) provides some evidence that this is the case in Argentina.   
51 For example, Dahlberg et al (2006) use a discontinuous element in one grant in Sweden to address the endogeneity 
problem and find evidence that there is a flypaper effect on the expenditure side but not on sub-national taxation. Acosta 
(2010) finds evidence of a flypaper effect in municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, but the effect is lower when 
he takes into consideration the impact on the neighbor’s decision. 
52 With data from Argentine provinces, and Brazilian and US states, Vegh and Vuletin (2010) provide some empirical 
evidence that there is no puzzle when one considers that raising local taxes is socially costly. It makes sense to spend 
more from intergovernmental transfers that have no efficiency cost than from local taxes. Their empirical evidence 
suggests that the flypaper effect is larger when local tax rates are higher.  
53 The Second Generation Fiscal Federalism stresses the importance of the incentives faced by local policymakers. See 
Weingast (2006). 
54 Rattsö and Tovmö (2002) find evidence for Denmark that local governments have asymmetric responses to shocks by 
raising personal income tax rates when there are negative shocks (but they find no similar effect on property tax rates). 
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The econometric analysis has to deal with the problem of endogeneity of the intergovernmental 
transfers. There is no such a problem with automatic transfers in Argentina because they are 
calculated using formulas that have no relationship with any economic variable and they are applied 
to revenues collected by the federal government from VAT, income taxes, excises and other taxes 
whose evolution has little to do with any provincial decision.55 But there is a problem with 
discretionary transfers56 that might depend on the bargaining power of the different levels of 
government.  
Provincial characteristics differ in Argentina and this may affect their potential tax bases. For 
example, more developed provinces or high-growth provinces should be able to collect more revenue 
from taxes on property and also from the cascade sales tax; more transparency should reduce evasion 
in local taxes57; provinces differ in their economic structure with sectors that are more difficult to tax 
than others; income distribution and informality also differ across regions, etcetera. It is interesting to 
estimate whether each province is using most of its potential to collect its taxes.58 
3.a. Estimates of the revenue elasticity  
 
Sturzenegger and Werner (2006) argue that the elasticities of sub-national tax revenues to 
provincial GDP are very high in Argentina, higher than those of central government transfers. If this 
were the case, decentralization of tax revenues might increase revenue volatility.  In particular, they 
find that sub-national revenues are strongly procyclical, where the tax component is uniformly more 
procyclical than the resources obtained from national sources (transfers). Among the taxes it is 
ingresos brutos the one with the highest degree of procyclicality, while property taxes, as expected, 
                                                                                                                                                        
They also find some evidence that socialist local governments rely more on property taxes than center-right local 
governments. Higher vertical imbalances may also provide more incentives to engage in corruption, and the composition 
of own-source revenues also matters. For example, Schleifer and Vishny (1998) conclude that local governments in 
Poland are more supportive of business and growth than in Russia because they rely more on revenues from property 
taxes, local taxes and fees more related to the growth rate of the region and this provides incentives for local 
policymakers to foster growth instead of rent-seeking.  
55 Artana et al. (2010) provide some evidence that the improvement in the terms of trade and the increase of the 
Brazilian economy in US$ accounted for 50% to 75% of growth experienced in Argentina from 2003 to 2008. External 
factors had a key role in the growth performance of the country during this period. 
56 Discretionary transfers are not new in Argentina’s federalism. Nicolini et al (2002) found evidence that the ATN 
(Aportes del Tesoro Nacional) acted as an insurance to shocks during the period 1983-1997. 
57 Govinda Rao (2006) argues that many poor countries lack clear property rights and this reduces the potential revenues 
of the “prime candidate” for sub-national taxation. It is possible that delays in the distribution of property titles have 
affected the collection of property taxes in some Argentine provinces. 
58 For a discussion of what explain the cross country variation in revenues see Artana and Templado (2010). Gordon and 
Li (2009) and Keen and Simone (2004) provide some theoretical insights of why revenues and their composition differ 
across countries. Kenney and Winner (2006) provide an insight from a political economy point of view. 
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have very little relation with the business cycle. Their estimations are based on a provincial panel for 
the period 1992-2002.  
Following a similar approach to Sturzenegger and Werner (2006) we estimate Income Elasticities 
of Revenues as: 
 
(1)  itiitit
uGDPy   )log()log( 10      i=1…N    t=1…T    
 
where y are different measures of provincial revenues, GDP is the provincial GDP (both measured in 
real terms) and u is a (provincial level) fixed effect. The fixed effect captures average differences 
between provinces. We are interested in the size of β1, what we called the revenue elasticities. These 
are not exactly income elasticities, because revenues are affected by the multiple changes in tax rates 
and tax bases. To control for the changes is complex, because there have been many changes in the 
20 year time-window we analyze, some of them difficult to identify empirically (such as 
administrative changes with impact on revenues).   
Table 9 shows the results for the period 1993-2009. The first regression in column (1) considers 
Total Provincial Revenues as the dependent variable and includes sub-national taxes, transfers from 
Central Government and Non-tax revenues (of which, the most important are royalties) as 
explanatory variables. The second column removes royalties from the explanation, showing that the 
procyclical behavior of revenues is not related to this component. Column (3) takes into account only 
sub-national tax revenues, and column (4) only the Central Government Transfers, showing that both 
dependent variables have similar elasticities (own-tax revenues have a slightly higher elasticity but it 
is not significantly different from the elasticity for transfers). Column (5) and (6) break own-tax 
revenue of provinces in the cascade sales tax (5) and other taxes (6) showing that pro-cyclicality 
comes from the cascade sales tax. 
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Table 9. Income Elasticities of provincial revenues 
(Provincial) Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 computes GDP elasticities for each of the main components of local tax revenues and 
for central government transfers. As in Sturzenegger and Werner (2006) we find a very low elasticity 
for property tax and a high elasticity for cascade sales tax. Unlike Sturzenegger and Werner, we open 
the elasticity for Central Government transfers in the two main components, finding a coefficient 
close to 1 for automatic transfers and a very high elasticity for discretionary transfers. 
Elasticities might have changed in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Simple scatter diagrams 
show clear differences only for Property Tax and Discretionary Transfers. To test whether the 
differences are statistically significant we estimate the same fixed effect model but including slope 
and constant dummies to distinguish the 1990s from the 2000s (dummy taking 1 for the period of 
Convertibility 1993-2001). The coefficient for slope dummy can be interpreted as the increment (or 
decrease if negative) in the elasticity value for the 1990s compared to the 2000s. Table 11 presents 
the results for these elasticities. The results are consistent with the scatter diagrams: overall 
provincial revenue elasticity (including or excluding royalties) has not changed significantly. The 
income elasticity of Central Government Transfers has increased and the elasticity of Provincial 
Own-tax Revenue has decreased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, reversing the result found by 
Sturzenegger and Werner: in the 2000s transfer elasticities have become more elastic than own-tax 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Provincial 
Total 
Revenues 
Provincial 
Own Tax 
Revenue+ 
Transfers 
Provincial 
Own Tax 
Revenues 
Total 
Transfers 
Cascade 
sales Tax 
Revenue 
Other (than 
Cascade 
sales) 
Provincial 
Tax 
Revenue 
Log(GDP) 1.387*** 1.334*** 1.405*** 1.373*** 1.738*** 0.768*** 
(34.89) (31.16) (27.53) (27.86) (31.05) (8.32) 
Constant -4.922*** -4.553*** -6.861*** 
-
5.207*** -10.09*** -2.676*** 
(-14.64) (-12.57) (-15.90) (-12.49) (-21.32) (-3.43) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.761 0.717 0.664 0.67 0.716 0.153 
F 1217.2 970.8 758 776.1 964.4 69.29 
Notes: 
t statistics in 
parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
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revenue. The decline in the elasticity of Provincial Tax Revenues is explained by property tax and the 
stamp tax, since for the cascade sales tax there is not a significant change in the elasticity. For central 
government transfers, the increase is significant for both, automatic and discretionary transfers, 
although the largest change is clearly in the discretionary transfers.59  
 
Table 10. Income Elasticities of provincial taxes 
(Provincial) Fixed Effect Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sub-national Main Taxes Transfers 
Stamp Tax Property Tax 
Cascade 
sales Tax Discretionary Automatic 
Log(GDP) 0.805*** 0.199*** 1.738*** 3.057*** 1.205*** 
(6.47) (2.76) (31.05) (16.46) (27.34) 
Constant -4.053*** 1.414** -10.09*** -21.82*** -3.930*** 
(-3.87) 
 
(-2.27) (-21.32) (-13.89) (-10.54) 
Observations 379 306 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.106 0.026 0.716 0.414 0.661 
F 41.91 7.633 964.4 270.9 747.5 
Notes: 
t statistics in 
parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
 
 
Finally, if we include in the analysis a dummy for the year 2002, which was the year of the 
structural break (exit of Convertibility and large economic crisis) all the estimated elasticities are 
lower and the 2002 dummy is significant in all the regressions, indicating that revenues decrease 
more than usual in that year. For example, for total transfers the elasticity is reduced from 1.382 to 
1.151 and for the cascade sales tax, from 1.53 to 1.249.60  
Summing up, the empirical evidence suggests that the cascade sales tax is pro-cyclical, but the 
elasticity using the entire period, or the one found by Sturzenegger and Werner that uses the period 
1992-2002, is upward biased due to the structural break. Controlling for the break tends to reduce the 
estimated elasticity. Also important is the fact that sub-national tax revenues are not more pro-
                                               
59 The constant dummy we include in each regression captures the average change in the tax burden in the 1990s 
compared to the 2000s. The main changes are in discretionary transfers and property tax revenues 
60 Results are available from the authors. 
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cyclical than central government transfers (they were in the 1990s, although the differences were not 
statistically significant, and the situation is reversed in the 2000s).  
 
Table 11.A. Income Elasticities of provincial revenues. 1990s vs 2000s 
(Provincial) Fixed Effect Estimation 
Provincial 
Total 
Revenues 
Provincial Own 
Tax Revenue+ 
Transfers 
Provincial 
Own Tax 
Revenues 
Total 
Transfers 
Cascade 
sales Tax 
Revenue 
Other (than 
Cascade sales) 
Provincial Tax 
Revenue 
Entire Period 1.387 1.334 1.405 1.373 1.738 0.768 
2000s 1.274 1.312 1.297 1.382 1.530 0.822 
1990s 1.263 1.291 1.338 1.292 1.532 0.932 
Significance of the 
difference ** *** *** 
 
Table 11.B. Income Elasticities of provincial taxes. 1990s vs 2000s 
 
(Provincial) Fixed Effect Estimation 
Sub-national Taxes Transfers 
Stamp 
Tax Property Tax 
Cascade 
sales Tax Discretionary Automatic 
Entire Period 0.805 0.199 1.738 3.057 1.205 
2000s 1.251 0.390 1.530 2.530 1.280 
1990s 1.361 0.454 1.532 2.069 1.227 
** *** *** *** 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Different elasticities for the subperiods are obtained though slope dummies. 
 
 
3.b. The impact of federal transfers on provincial taxes 
 
In this section we explore the determinants of the tax structure, and in particular we are interested 
in the role of federal government transfers. The stylized fact we want to explain is the change in the 
tax structure at provincial level observed in Argentina in the 2000s, where cascade taxes have gained 
weight and other taxes (particularly property taxes) have lost, at the same time that central 
government transfers became more discretional. Two hypotheses consistent with this structural 
change are: i) sub-national governments reduced tax pressure on more visible taxes (property tax) 
and/or ii) inflation (inexistent in the 1990s) has favored taxes that are automatically indexed to 
inflation. Critical to the argument is the role of central government transfers; if they affect the local 
government own-source revenue effort, there is a sort of flypaper effect. If transfers distort local 
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incentives, we should observe that provinces with larger increase in transfers distort their behavior 
the most. 
The econometric model is: 
 
              (2)         itiitkitit
utxy  
      i=1…N    t=1…T   
 
where yit is either a measure of sub-national government effort (tax pressure) or a measure of tax 
structure, xit is a vector of provincial characteristics, tit are central government transfers and ui are 
provincial specific effect (uncorrelated with εit, but could be correlated with xit or tit). Central 
Government transfers in Argentina comprise two elements: automatic transfers, which are exogenous 
(determined by rules not linked to the cycle), and discretionary transfers, which are endogenous. 
Endogeneity contaminates the estimation of the parameters in the fixed effect OLS estimation. An 
alternative is to use Instrumental Variables which requires valid instruments.61 We propose two 
instruments, related with political economy issues: (i) Deputies’ overrepresentation and (ii) Senators’ 
overrepresentation (defined as ratio of the number of national deputies/senators to the provincial 
population).62 63 
First we analyze the tax structure, where our dependent variable is the share of the turnover tax 
(CT) and the share of property taxes (PT) on sub-national tax revenues. The CT is the most important 
tax for most of the provinces, representing on average 67% of the own-source taxes; PT, on the other 
hand, represents on average just 10% of tax collection, the rest is explained by the stamp tax, 
automobile tax and other minor taxes. 
                                               
61 The two conditions for a valid instrument z are: it has to be correlated with the endogenous variable and it has to be a 
valid exclusion in the original equation (i.e. not affecting the variable y directly). A special concern when using 
instrumental variables is the presence of weak instruments (low partial correlation of z with x); therefore, as suggested in 
the literature, we will pay special attention to the first stage, and check robustness with alternative methods to the IV 
estimators (such as Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimators, which are more robust to weak 
instruments). 
62 We explored a third instrument: Color of Party, defined as the coincidence or not of the provincial government party 
with the national government (classification done based on the opinion of political experts consulted) but it fails as an 
instrument.  
63 Our two instruments do have variation on time, although most of the explanatory power comes from the cross section 
variation. The province with the largest increase in overrepresentation shows a change between 2009 and 1993 of 21%, 
whereas the highest decrease is -27.7%. The two instruments explain between 20 and 35% of the cross section variation 
between provinces in discretionary transfers (OLS regression year by year). In a fixed effect model for the entire period, 
the overall R2 is 0.27, with 0.43 for the R2 between variation and 0.12 for the R2 within variation. 
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Table 12 presents the results for the estimation of equation (2) by fixed effect. There is clearly a 
pattern: the fall in property tax share is associated to an increase in the central government transfers 
(as a share of local GDP), and to an increase in the inflation rate. Royalties have not a significant 
effect on tax structure. It is interesting to note that discretionary and automatic transfers tend to have 
the same sign. Table 13 reports the Instrumental Variable (IV) Fixed Effect Model estimations with 
similar qualitative results (although some parameters become not significant). 
 
Table 12: Tax Structure. Fixed Effect Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PT Share CT Share PT Share CT Share PT Share CT Share 
log(DT/GDP) -0.0163*** 0.0404*** -0.00916*** 0.0228*** -0.00587*** 0.0127*** 
(-8.36) (9.16) (-4.56) (5.12) (-2.88) (2.87) 
log(AT/GDP) -0.0369*** 0.0133 -0.0270*** -0.0109 -0.0253*** -0.00951 
(-3.99) -0.64 (-3.14) (-0.57) (-3.02) (-0.52) 
log(Roy/GDP) -0.00707*** 0.0130** -0.0000421 -0.00423 0.0000593 -0.00508 
(-2.87) (2.34) (-0.02) (-0.78) (0.03) (-1.01) 
Log(GDP) -0.0709*** 0.173*** -0.0341*** 0.0763*** 
(-8.19) (9.03) (-3.37) (3.47) 
Provincial Inflation 
Rate -0.0160*** 0.0339*** 
(-5.22) (5.07) 
Dum90s 0.00048 -0.0166* 
(0.12) (-1.87) 
Constant -0.0981*** 0.965*** 0.601*** -0.747*** 0.334*** -0.0168 
(-3.71) (16.18) (6.77) (-3.79) (3.50) (-0.08) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.262 0.226 0.373 0.362 0.434 0.448 
F 45.12 37.01 56.46 54 48.34 51.12 
Notes: 
t statistics in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
log(DT/GDP)= log of Discretionary Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(AT/GDP)= log of Automatic Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(Roy/GDP)= log of Royalties as a ratio of provincial GDP 
Dum90s= 1 for 1993 to 2001 
 
 
The results show that: 
 economic activity and inflation increase the share of the cascade tax in own source tax 
revenue but reduce the share of the property tax, as expected given that the tax base of the 
cascade tax is associated to the size of the nominal GDP, while property taxation needs costly 
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(and visible for the taxpayer) adjustments in the valuation of properties only to maintain its 
purchasing power in real terms.  
 Discretionary transfers increase the share of the cascade tax and reduce the share of the 
property tax while automatic transfers have no statistical significant effect on the share of the 
cascade tax but reduce the share of the property tax in some specifications of the model (column 
(1) in Table 13 and columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 12). This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the “windfall” of discretionary transfers is partially used to reduce the share of the 
most visible property tax.64 On the other hand, automatic transfers do not affect the tax structure, 
consistent with the idea that, because they are anticipated, they are incorporated in the budget 
process of each province. 
 The dummy that takes a value of 1 in the 1990’s and 0 otherwise is significant only for the 
cascade tax in Table 12 but with the expected sign in all the specifications: there was an upward 
drift in the collections of this tax after the economic crisis. In the instrumental variable 
specification the dummy is not significant in all the cases  
 The collection of royalties has an effect in the same direction of automatic transfers in 
column (1) and (2) of Table 12, but once provincial GDP is included as a regressor, royalties 
become non significant. 
The tax structure does not necessarily show the tax effort. To measure tax burden we use the tax 
collection of the cascade sales and the property taxes as fractions of the provincial GDPs (both 
measured in logs, in order to have elasticities as our parameters of interest). Hausmann endogeneity 
test (using the Deputies and Senators overrepresentation as instruments) indicates that Discretionary 
Transfers are endogenous; therefore we report only the results for the instrumental variable 
estimators.65 
 
 
 
                                               
64However, the estimated coefficients suggest a moderate to low effect. To see this, consider for instance the unweighted 
average discretional transfers for the entire sample (2.36% of GDP) and the average share of cascade tax (67% of total 
own source revenues). An estimated coefficient 0.028 implies that an increase in one percentage point of GDP in 
discretional transfers (i.e. increasing transfers from 2.36% to 3.36%) implies an increase in the share of cascade tax of 
one percentage point that is an increase in the share of CT from 67% to 68%. 
65 Deputies and Senators overrepresentation variables explain on overall 27% of the variation in the ratio of Discretional 
Transfers to GDP, and pass the Cragg-Donald test of weak instruments. Also according to Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected at 1% significance level. 
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Table 13: Tax Structure. Instrumental Variable (IV) Fixed Effect Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PT Share CT Share PT Share CT Share 
log(DT/GDP) -0.0155*** 0.0197 -0.0171*** 0.0283** 
(-2.72) (1.58) (-3.09) (2.41) 
log(AT/GDP) -0.0201* -0.00753 -0.0127 -0.0269 
(-1.92) (-0.33) (-1.23) (-1.22) 
log(Roy/GDP) -0.000363 -0.00439 -0.000666 -0.00407 
(-0.15) (-0.81) (-0.28) (-0.79) 
Log(GDP) -0.0589*** 0.179*** -0.0247** 0.0633*** 
(-4.42) (6.15) (-2.20) (2.65) 
Provincial Inflation 
Rate -0.0148*** 0.0322*** 
(-4.62) (4.71) 
dum90s -0.00488 -0.00914 
(-1.00) (-0.89) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 
F 32.77 30.08 23.99 35.96 
Notes: 
t statistics for robust standard errors in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
log(DT/GDP)= log of Discretionary Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(AT/GDP)= log of Automatic Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(Roy/GDP)= log of Royalties as a ratio of provincial GDP 
Dum90s= 1 for 1993 to 2001 
 
 
Table 14 shows the main results.66  Real GDP and inflation rate at provincial level affect tax 
effort in the same direction that they affect the tax structure: they reduce the tax pressure of Property 
Taxes but increase the tax pressure of Cascade Taxes. The dummy variable comparing 1990s and 
2000s shows that tax pressure (at the same level of transfers, GDP and inflation) was smaller in the 
1990s than in the 2000s. Finally, in terms of Central Government transfers we find an asymmetric 
response: Discretionary Transfers tend to reduce the tax pressure on both property and cascade taxes 
(the effect is larger for the property tax, consistent with the previous finding of a reduction in its 
share on local tax revenue), whereas Automatic Transfers increase both.67 This apparent 
                                               
66 Since some provinces have delegated the property tax to municipalities, our property tax revenue figure might be 
measured with errors for these cases. To control for this, we run the models also excluding these provinces (Chubut, 
Formosa, Salta, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego), the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficient do not change, but 
the model using PT as dependent variable fits much better, suggesting measurement errors is not contaminating our 
estimates but increasing standard errors (results are available from the authors). 
67 The negative effect of Discretionary Transfers is positive if we do not control for endogeneity (just fixed effect 
estimations). Since: 
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contradictory effect needs to be explained in more detail. Discretionary Transfers seem to work as a 
free lunch, reducing the effort. On the other hand, the finding that automatic transfers do not affect 
tax structure but increase the tax pressure might be related with the fact that most provinces receive 
more automatic transfers than what they contribute to the revenue pool.68 This regional redistribution 
of income helps to improve the standard of living (at least for some parts of the population) and to 
increase consumption, favoring the collection of property taxes and the cascade sales tax.  
 
 
Table 14. Tax Structure. IV Fixed Effect Estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PT /PBI CT /PBI PT /PBI CT /PBI PT /PBI CT /PBI 
log(DT/GDP) -0.173 -0.177** -0.231* -0.154*** -0.239** -0.149*** 
(-1.25) (-2.52) (-1.94) (-3.20) (-2.05) (-3.75) 
log(AT/GDP) 0.592** 1.060*** 0.920*** 0.738*** 1.039*** 0.674*** 
(2.06) (7.25) (4.21) (8.36) (4.77) (9.07) 
log(Roy/GDP) -0.0435 0.102*** 0.0526 -0.00828 0.0432 -0.0092 
(-0.81) (3.75) (1.02) (-0.40) (0.85) (-0.53) 
Log(GDP) -0.742*** 0.911*** -0.509** 0.273*** 
(-2.67) (8.13) (-2.14) (3.37) 
Provincial Inflation 
Rate -0.244*** 0.196*** 
(-3.59) (8.50) 
Dum90s -0.258** -0.0695** 
(-2.52) (-1.99) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 408 408 
F 2.553 29.05 15.29 57.12 13.31 70.75 
Anderson canon. 
corr. LM statistic 29.828 29.828 48.438 48.438 55.235 55.235 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 16 16 19.9 19.9 31.67 31.67 
F 2.553 29.05 15.29 57.12 13.31 70.75 
Notes: 
t statistics in parentheses,  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
log(DT/GDP)= log of Discretionary Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(AT/GDP)= log of Automatic Transfers as a ratio of provincial GDP 
log(Roy/GDP)= log of Royalties as a ratio of provincial GDP 
Dum90s= 1 for 1993 to 2001 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the results suggest that cov(x,e) is positive what implies discretionary transfers work in practice more like conditional 
than compensatory transfers in Argentina (unobserved effort in tax collection is compensated with additional transfers). 
Using instruments for automatic transfers (falsification of the endogeneity assumption) do not change the results of the 
estimated coefficient for this variable, what suggests the instruments are working well. 
68 Excluding the City of Buenos Aires that demands a deeper analysis because the federal government pays part of the 
local services, there are 17 out of 23 provinces that have a lower share on the country’s GDP than their share in 
automatic federal transfers. If an estimate of the wage bill is used, the figure raises to 21 out of 23 provinces. Only 
province of Buenos Aires (to a large extent) and Chubut are the net payers to the rest of the provinces. If we exclude 
these two provinces from our regressions the elasticity of automatic transfers increase, suggesting part of the explanation 
is due to this effect. 
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3.c. The Effect of Federal Transfers on Provincial Expenditures 
 
In this section we analyze the other side of the same coin: expenditures. We used the same 
specification but using as dependent variable the log of provincial total expenditure and log of 
provincial capital expenditures (both as a share of the provincial GDP). Table 15 shows the results 
without controlling for endogeneity, where both types of transfers and the royalties have positive 
elasticities. Table 16 controls for endogeneity of the discretionary transfers, showing how the 
coefficient changes (ie, were formerly contaminated by endogeneity). In particular, the positive effect 
on total expenditures turns negative now, although it is close to zero (elasticity of -0.07), whereas the 
elasticity of automatic transfers is still positive and high at 0.73. This shows that discretionary 
transfers are not used to increase total expenditures, but as shown above they decrease own-source 
revenue effort. For capital expenditures we find a positive result suggesting that a fraction of 
discretionary transfers are used for capital expenditures, but not for current expenditures.  
The results suggest provinces react differently to the central government transfers, depending on 
the nature of the transfer. Automatic transfers are consumed and, at the same time, they increase the 
tax bases of some provincial taxes easing higher revenues. This reaction is consistent with a 
permanent income shock. But discretionary transfers are seen as temporary income.69 Provinces use 
part of them to increase capital expenditures and another part to reduce own taxes. This reduction 
may be reversed later if the political game (or shortages of funds) force a reduction for the 
discretional amounts received from the Federal government. This is a particular type of the “flypaper 
effect”. 
Our empirical findings are important for a proposal to improve sub-national revenue 
mobilization. It would be better to rely less on discretional transfers, but they are better replaced by 
the allocation of more tax bases. If they are converted into automatic transfers they are likely to 
increase government expenditures with no reduction in the vertical imbalance. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
69 Unlike consumers, provinces have no incentive to save the temporary income (the discretional transfers) because this 
may trigger a retaliation of the Federal government reducing the amounts transferred in the future. Saving in a provincial 
fund has no immediate political benefits, while the inauguration of infrastructure programs may be appealing to 
politicians of all levels of government. At the same time, provinces may try to finance current expenditures with more 
permanent sources of revenues to avoid a higher dependency from the Federal government in the future.  
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Table 15. Sub-national Expenditure: Fixed Effect Estimation  
 
Dependent variable: log expenditure on GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Capital Exp. Total Exp. Capital Exp. Total Exp. Capital Exp. Total Exp. 
log(DT/GDP) 0.107*** 0.0346*** 0.04 0.0345*** 0.0721** 0.0427*** 
(3.68) (4.00) (1.22) (3.59) (2.21) (4.62) 
log(AT/GDP) 1.346*** 0.665*** 1.251*** 0.665*** 1.147*** 0.601*** 
(9.82) (16.29) (9.33) (16.10) (8.57) (15.81) 
log(Roy/GDP) 0.0628* 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(1.72) (1.04) (-0.11) (0.97) (0.17) (1.60) 
Log(GDP) 0.676*** 0.00 0.768*** (0.07) 
(5.02) (0.02) (4.75) (-1.50) 
Provincial Inflation 
Rate 0.113** 0.116*** 
(2.29) (8.30) 
Dum90s 0.277*** 0.153*** 
(4.25) (8.29) 
Constant 0.41 7.028*** -6.259*** 7.020*** -7.369*** 7.278*** 
(1.05) (60.11) (-4.53) (16.49) (-4.82) (16.78) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.291 0.496 0.335 0.496 0.365 0.592 
F 52.04 125.2 47.8 93.66 36.22 91.22 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Sub-national Expenditure: IV Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
Dependent variable: log expenditure on GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capital Exp. Total Exp. Capital Exp. Total Exp. Capital Exp. Total Exp. 
log(DT/GDP) (0.06) -0.0663* 0.10 -0.0658** 0.144* -0.0706** 
(-0.56) (-1.84) (1.09) (-2.15) (1.68) (-2.47) 
log(AT/GDP) 1.627*** 0.835*** 1.189*** 0.775*** 1.067*** 0.727*** 
(7.23) (11.13) (7.36) (13.81) (6.66) (13.61) 
log(Roy/GDP) 0.0911** 0.0284** (0.00) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(2.18) (2.04) (-0.04) (0.47) (0.29) (0.77) 
Log(GDP) 0.568*** 0.190*** 0.708*** 0.03 
(2.77) (2.66) (4.06) (0.44) 
Provincial Inflation 
Rate 0.105** 0.128*** 
(2.11) (7.70) 
Dum90s 0.311*** 0.0995*** 
(4.13) (3.97) 
Observations 408.00 408.00 408.00 408.00 408.00 408.00 
R-squared 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.43 
F 43.8 89.4 47.3 71.47 35.42 63.76 
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3.d. Are provinces exploiting their tax bases? 
 
It is interesting to analyze whether provinces are exploiting adequately their tax bases. There are 
different alternatives to do the analysis. One option is to use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). This 
technique was used for production functions and more recently it was adapted to revenue effort.70 
This is akin to our Data Envelope Analysis for provincial tax authorities (See Artana et al., 2012), a 
process that is advisable when there are many “inputs” that influence the “output” and it is not clear 
which is the “production function” that links them. In this analysis, each province would be 
compared to the “efficient frontier”. 
Another option is a Regression-Based model where each province is compared with the average 
provincial tax effort. Both techniques have the problem that a departure from the frontier or the 
average may be a provincial decision to have a lower tax burden or the consequence of inefficiencies 
in collecting taxes. But given the information that we have and the purpose of the analysis we prefer 
a Regression-Based model for the following reasons: 
 the SFA estimates the parameter of inefficiency from the errors in the equation. In our 
case there are heteroskedasticity, spatial correlation and autocorrelation that are better 
addressed with a Regression-Based model. The use of Panel-corrected standard error 
corrects the variance-covariance estimation in order to account for these assumptions 
failure. Such correction (especially for the spatial correlation) has been not developed yet 
in the context of SFA 
 The SFA was originally designed for production functions where it is easier to include all 
inputs that affect production. When used to analyze the performance of tax revenues it is 
likely that many “inputs” will be missing for lack of information. More specifically, 
“inputs” related to tax administration are crucial in a SFA analysis because the main 
purpose of the exercise is to detect deviations from an efficient performance. In a 
regression-based analysis there is no attempt to separate a decision to collect more taxes 
because the society prefers a lower size of government from a lower collection due to a 
poor tax administration.71  
                                               
70 Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) use this technique at the national level. 
71 Esteller-Moré (2003) provides an example of the amount of information that is necessary to include, especially with 
regards to tax administration, which is not available for a panel of Argentine provinces.  
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 In the case of fixed-effect panels, SFA is subject to the “incidental parameter problem”72 
that affects the consistency property of the parameter estimations.73 Some exercises to 
address this problem have been developed in recent years.74 Moreover, the application of 
this recommended transformation does not protect the estimations from the particular 
error structure that we have in the data  
We use as dependent variable Total Tax Revenues Per Capita of each province. As explanatory 
variables we use: Local GDP per capita, Deposits as percentage of local GDP, years of education of 
the population over 16 years, poverty index, the share of the agro-industrial activities on the GDP, 
Royalties,  Mining (as share of local GDP) and the automatic transfers of the central government to 
each province.75 
Table 17 shows the results for different alternatives. As expected, income, automatic transfers, 
deposits, years of education (except the last years where the sign is reversed and significance is lost) 
have all coefficients that are positive. Royalties are negative but statistically insignificant. Poverty 
has the negative expected sign and is also significant. The agro-industrial and mining shares both 
show negative relations with tax collection, however mining shows a stronger relation. Two dummy 
variables were tried: one that captures the pre and post convertibility period,76 and another for the 
year 2002 to capture the impact of the economic crisis. 
The results of equation (5) (excluding the variables that are non-significant at 10%) are used to 
estimate revenue bands for each province and for each year. As of 2009 Catamarca, Formosa and 
Tucuman were collecting more than projected according to their characteristics; Chubut, San Luis 
and Santa Cruz were converging to the forecasting interval after some year of “excess” revenues; and 
Entre Rios and Santa Fe were collecting less than projected while Cordoba was converging after 
                                               
72 See Greene, W.H. (2005). 
73 As Wang and Ho (2010) comment on “true fixed-effect” model for SFA proposed by Greene: “For a fixed-effect 
model, the number of fixed-effect parameters (also called incidental parameters since their values are usually not of 
direct interest) increases with the number of individuals (N). In this situation, the conventional asymptotic result, which 
relies on N→∞, cannot be applied and estimates of the incidental parameters are necessarily inconsistent for a fixed T 
(number of observations per individual). For many estimators, inconsistency may also contaminate the estimates of the 
model's other parameters; the issue is referred to as the incidental parameters problem…. For instance, for linear 
models with normal errors, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the slope coefficients is still consistent, but that 
of the variance-covariance matrix is inconsistent…” 
74 See Wang and Ho (2010) and Chen et al (2011).  
75 The justification to include automatic transfers is that they increase the tax base of provincial taxes in most provinces. 
76 This dummy is 0 from 1993-2001 and 1 from 2002 to 2009. 
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some years of “low” revenues. The difference is relatively high for Entre Rios and Santa Fe with a 
shortage of about 15%.77  
 
Table17: Local revenues determinants (Panel-corrected standard errors used)78 
 
 
4. Priorities for reform  
 
In every country there are trade-offs to reform sub-national revenues and even opposing views 
depending on the use of normative or positive theories.79 These trade-offs may differ from one 
                                               
77  This may be a consequence of a decision to have lower taxes rather than a problem of efficiency. For example, Entre 
Rios and Santa Fe have relatively low weighted average rates in the Cascade Sales Tax in Figure 2, and relatively low 
tax rates on automobiles in Table 7. Santa Fe also has a relatively low tax rate on urban properties in Table 5. But they 
also show inefficiencies in their tax administration (see Artana et al., 2012). 
78 The model estimated shows evidence of  heteroscedasticity, contemporaneously correlation, and autocorrelation. The 
use of Panel-corrected standard error seems the most plausible estimation at this point. Fixed effects were captured with 
the inclusion of dummy variables for each province, these parameters estimation are not shown in the table for 
simplicity. 
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country to another but are particularly relevant for Argentina because political economy issues 
blocked previous proposals to reform both federal transfers and sub-national own-source revenues.80  
When making proposals to improve sub-national revenue mobilization we have to take into 
account some general restrictions for a tax reform and some particularities of Argentina. For 
example: 
 For most (if not all) tax handles there are important trade-offs to accomplish the multiple 
objectives that are expected from the tax system (minimum distortions, support the efforts 
to improve income distribution, minimum compliance and administration costs and 
revenues for the government). When political economy factors are added this is even 
worse because some “bad” taxes may be valuable for politicians if they provide the 
government with important revenues and are not visible to the average voter. 
 Usually, existing taxes are more accepted than new ones to the extent that some “learning 
by doing” is necessary. 
 Improvements in the efficiency of tax administration in Argentina face some limitations 
from inflexible labor rules that protect their employees, even those that are not efficient. 
 Both the General Government tax burden and the vertical imbalance of provinces are high 
in Argentina. Therefore, it would be advisable to raise own-source provincial revenues at 
the same time that the federal tax burden is reduced. One easy way out is a reduction of 
discretionary transfers but this would likely find a resistance of the Federal government 
that use them to “control” powerful governors or to “buy” votes in the Congress.      
 However, the analysis of previous sections shows that a reduction of discretionary 
transfers will improve own-source revenues, and that an eventual replacement by 
automatic transfers will be a bad alternative: it will not reduce the vertical imbalance, it 
will aggravate the perception that there is a soft budget constrain, and it will motivate an 
increase in government expenditures even though it is not evident that there is a need for 
that.  
 The timing for a reform is probably not appropriate. Fiscal deficits at the provincial level 
are small and are being financed mostly by the federal government, there are no strong 
leaders besides the President of the country, and all levels of government have paid little 
                                                                                                                                                        
79 For example, Ambrosiano and Bordignon (2006), Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2009), Ahmad and Brossio (2008). 
80 The political gridlock is evident: the 1994 reform of the Argentine Constitution mandated that a new Revenue Sharing 
regime should be enforced after 1996. So far no changes were agreed.   
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attention to the problems of the actual tax system. In fact, they have moved in the 
opposite direction by raising the share of the cascade sales tax at the expense of the 
property tax at the provincial level and at the federal level by maintaining “bad” taxes that 
were supposed to be temporary sources of financing to a government strapped for funds, 
even though that is no longer the case (e.g. the tax on financial transactions).  
In this context we can think of reforms that are more ambitious (with lower chances of success) 
and other less ambitious that look more feasible, like the improvement of existing taxes. 
On the more ambitious front we think that there is a lot to gain from replacing the Cascade Sales 
Tax by a provincial VAT that shares the same tax base than the federal VAT (to ease its 
administration), but allowing each province to set its rate inside a band that will be agreed among all 
provinces. To guarantee that provinces will not go back to cascade taxation, it would be better to 
include a restriction to do that under the new (and postponed) revenue sharing among the federal 
government and the provinces.  
The Retail Sales tax has some disadvantages compared with a VAT. For example, all revenues 
are obtained from retailers that in Latin-American countries may be more difficult to audit. If the 
retailer is able to evade the government loses all revenues while with a VAT it still collects some 
money from manufacturing. Moreover, it is difficult to tax only retail sales. Slemrod and Bakija 
(1996) quote empirical evidence from US states that show that about 40% to 50% of the revenues 
correspond to intermediate sales. The advantage of the retail sales tax is that exports are tax free 
while with the VAT they might be de facto taxed (in spite of being zero-rated by Law) by delaying 
the reimbursement of the VAT credits. 
But a provincial VAT has some problems, too. To minimize distortions it has to be a tax on final 
consumption. One option is to tax inter-provincial sales, but this requires that the province where the 
consumption is made reimburses the firms for all the VAT credits paid (including those paid to other 
provinces). Some provinces may be reluctant to reimburse the tax paid to other provinces, especially 
if they are strapped for funds. However, in Argentina, if provinces were ready to accept a similar tax 
base as the Federal VAT it would be possible to adopt a clearing house of VAT credits because the 
provincial VATs will be added to the invoice together with the Federal tax. This will provide other 
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source of information to reduce tax elusion and the possibility to include the Federal government as 
an arbiter in the clearing house.81   
Another option is to zero-rate interprovincial sales. The problem of carousel fraud that has 
affected the European Community is likely to be less severe given the existence of a Federal VAT.82 
An eventual replacement of Ingresos Brutos by a less distortionary tax (Provincial VAT or Retail 
Sales tax) would need to solve complex political economy problems. The impact on the personal and 
regional distribution of income might be different. To estimate the impact on the regional distribution 
of tax revenues we need to estimate the regional source of the Federal VAT tax collection. This will 
provide us with an approximation of the revenues that each province would perceive if they decide to 
replace the cascade tax with a piggy back on the Federal VAT (or with a retail sales tax with similar 
exemptions and reduced rates than the VAT).  
The Federal VAT has a general rate of 21%, but some goods (usually food) are taxed at 10.5% 
and many goods and services are exempt. The best proxy of the tax base is Consumption. As this 
macroeconomic aggregate is not available at the geographical level, we estimated the shares of each 
jurisdiction by utilizing labor income (salaried and not salaried) from the Households’s Permanent 
Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC).  In addition, it is necessary to distinguish goods 
taxed at different rates from exempt goods. Using the shares of each good and service in the 
expenditure survey we simulated the weighted average tax collection. To distribute it among the 24 
provinces we used the shares on the National Households’ Expenses Survey (Encuesta Nacional de 
Gasto de los Hogares) 1996/97 baskets, the last one available with the required disaggregation. On 
average, a surtax of 7.1% of the Federal VAT would be required to ensure the same revenues of the 
cascade tax but there are important differences by province. For example, there are 6 provinces that 
may match the actual collections with a surcharge rate lower than 6% (compared to the average 
7.1%) and there are other 6 provinces that need rates higher than 9% to maintain the collections.83 
Most of the winners are poor provinces that receive large transfers from the rest of the country (i.e. 
these are provinces with large “current account deficits”), and about half of the losers are oil-
producing provinces that will lose this easy-to-tax base when the taxation is shifted from production 
                                               
81 The Federal government has to intervene in foreign trade. For imports the situation is not much different to the 
withholdings of Ingresos Brutos that is made at Customs and sent later to each province. For exports the Federal 
government is already reimbursing the VAT credits on the Federal VAT and could do the same for the provincial VATs. 
If this were the case the Federal government will be one actor of the clearing house. 
82 Bird (2007) mentions that in the Canadian case a Federal VAT provides more guarantees. 
83 These are rough estimates because they ignore changes in compliance. 
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to final consumption. Among the large provinces, the city of Buenos Aires would lose with the 
change reflecting the important contribution of financial services and of large firms under the 
Multilateral Agreement that have offices (and expenses) in the City.  Mendoza and province of 
Buenos Aires are modest gainers from the change. 
Unlike the Cascade Sales Tax that is not visible for consumers, both taxes on consumption have 
the advantage of being transparent to the end user. However, provincial rates that fluctuate inside an 
ample band are likely to create problems (at least for border transactions), and are complicated from 
a political point of view. Therefore, it is likely that some compensation will be necessary for the 
losing provinces that should be financed from the rest of the country. This is possible through 
amendments in the secondary distribution of the revenue sharing arrangement, but it is likely to be 
very demanding and probably request a complete overhaul of the system that is unlikely to be 
approved.  
A replacement of the turnover by a provincial VAT will not reduce the vertical imbalance, but 
may open a window to do that if the federal VAT rate is also reduced to allow the provinces to have a 
higher provincial rate. 
Another option is to allow the provinces to introduce a surtax on some excises like those that fall 
on fuels or even to transfer part of the tax power of the Federal government.  
A less-ambitious proposal is to improve the turnover by reversing some of the bad decisions that 
complicated the administration of the tax in recent years. This will require an agreement like the ones 
signed in the early 1990’s under the umbrella of the revenue sharing system for it to be credible (and 
with financial penalties to the provinces that do not comply). It is possible that some of the needed 
counter reforms have Constitutional support (e.g. the use of higher rates on manufacturers located in 
other provinces may be interpreted as a barrier on domestic trade that is forbidden by the 
Constitution). The elimination of some problems (like chronic excess withholdings) may be achieved 
if provinces agree that controversies with taxpayers have to be solved by an interprovincial Court 
(similar to the solution of disputes under the Convenio Multilateral) but with a more important role 
for impartial judges rather than the participation of the Ministries of Economy of each province that 
is used today under the Convenio. 
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If primary activities and manufacturing are exempt from the tax and there is some coordination in 
the taxing of financial intermediation and transport, the cascade will be reduced substantially.84 
With respect to taxation of real estate it is possible to use a National Cadastre (as proposed in 
2007 but that has not been working so far) to improve on some of the pitfalls observed in recent 
years. In a more comprehensive reform the National Cadastre will be the only one responsible for the 
valuation of properties in all the country. This Cadastre may be “owned” by the 24 provinces but will 
be less subject to local political interference by being accountable to the 24 governors and the 
Federal government. A National Cadastre can use the same criteria to value property in all the 
country and impose a minimum correction for inflation.85 Provinces may undo the final effect of this 
decision on their voters by reducing the tax rate, but an external valuation will eliminate the fiscal 
externality that today encourages some provinces to underestimate the value of properties: for many 
properties the Federal government uses the fiscal value as the base of the tax on personal assets. To 
avoid a windfall benefit for the Federal government it may reduce the rate of the federal tax for the 
properties located in the provinces that agreed to participate in the National Cadastre. This will be an 
incentive for provinces to adhere to the reform.  
  
                                               
84 It would be better to extend the exemption to financial activities and transport but as they are important sources of 
revenue for some provinces this proposal is unlikely to receive much support.  
85 A permanent assessment of the market value of properties is very expensive. Therefore, some general indexation of 
the tax value is necessary even with an efficient cadastre. 
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